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Housing is a necessity and an important part of household welfare. For this reason, a number 
of different subsidies and government regulations have been implemented with the aim of 
ensuring a reasonable housing standard for all households. This thesis is concerned with one 
of the most notable features of the Finnish housing subsidy system which is the promotion of 
homeownership through tax subsidies, i.e. indirectly through tax law. The thesis consists of 
four chapters. The first chapter serves as an introductory background for chapters 2–4 which 
constitute the main contribution of the thesis. These chapters include three individual 
empirical studies that address owner-occupied housing and its tax-treatment from different 
points of view. 
 
The introductory chapter starts with a short overview of recent Finnish housing market 
developments and housing policy. Then it discusses the basic aspects of households’ tenure 
choice concentrating on agency problems involved with different tenure modes that may 
justify their different tax treatment. Furthermore, it covers various reasons proposed in the 
economics and popular literature on why homeownership should be favoured through public 
policy compared to renting. 
 
Chapter 2 analyses the tax incentives for mortgage demand. In 1993 a major tax reform was 
implemented in Finland which changed the tax deduction rates of mortgage interest, and thus, 
changed households’ incentives to borrow. The chapter studies whether households have 
responded to these changes. The results, based on the difference-in-differences method, show 
that high income households with high marginal tax rates have responded to the reduced tax 
incentives by reducing their mortgage borrowing compared to the control group, for whom 
the incentives to borrow remained more or less the same. 
 
Chapter 3 connects owner-occupied housing and mortgage debt into a broader context of 
household portfolio choice. The chapter presents empirical evidence on whether debt-financed 
owner-occupied housing, due to its nature as background risk, has an adverse effect on the 
amount of stocks in a household’s portfolio. The results indicate that owner-occupied housing 
has an adverse effect on household stockholding. More precisely, a higher house value at a 
given level of net wealth clearly reduces the probability that a household enters the stock 
market. 
 
Chapter 4 is concerned with the largest individual housing subsidy in Finland which is the 
non-taxation of imputed rental income. The chapter estimates the size of the subsidy and 
analyses its effects on household income distribution. The results indicate that owner-
occupied housing has a significant impact on the well-being of many households and that the 
government loses significant amounts of tax revenue due to this provision. The chapter also 
compares the current tax system where imputed rental income is untaxed to two alternative 
tenure neutral tax systems where imputed rental income is taxed. The main finding is that the 
effects of the reform on overall inequality depend vitally on the way the increased tax revenue 
is transferred back to the households. 
 
Keywords: owner-occupied housing, tax subsidy, mortgage interest deduction, portfolio 
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 1   Introduction 
 
Housing is a major contributor to household welfare. Housing is a necessity that satisfies a 
basic need for shelter. Housing costs are the largest individual item in households’ 
consumption bundle, and often, residential property is the single most important asset in 
households’ portfolios. As a consumption good, housing is peculiar in other ways as well.1 
Not only are houses durable, but they are also spatially fixed and unique. Although close 
substitutes exist, exactly identical houses cannot be found. Furthermore, the level of housing 
consumption can be adjusted only by incurring a cost. For homeowners this cost can be 
substantial, but also renter households face transaction costs when moving.  
 
In addition to a consumption motive, households need to consider investment aspects when 
they choose their tenure mode and the amount of housing services to consume. Henderson 
and Ioannides (1983) argue that homeowners’ consumption and investment decisions are 
intertwined. Because homeowners cannot own only a fraction of the house they reside in, 
consumption demand for housing services, in effect, introduces a lower bound for housing 
investment. In this case, a homeowner’s consumption and investment decisions are no longer 
separable. Furthermore, a mortgage is usually needed to finance the purchase of a house. 
Through mortgage financing financial intermediaries, mostly commercial banks in Finnish 
case, are more involved in the housing market than in any other market for consumer 
durables. This may create vulnerability to the economy as was witnessed by a deep recession 
partly driven by credit losses in Finland in the early 1990s and more recently by the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis in the U.S.  
 
The supply side of housing markets also differs from usual commodity markets. Housing 
supply is fixed in the short run and may be inelastic even in the longer run because of inherent 
scarcity of land suitable for residential construction. Thus, in the short run any demand shocks 
will be reflected in house prices creating price volatility. This in turn, may enhance business 
cycles because construction firms base their housing starts on price expectations. Also wealth 
effects from housing wealth to aggregate consumption may be stronger than from other assets 
because of the way housing wealth is distributed among households.  
                                                 
1 Early reviews of housing economics are Quigley (1979), Arnott (1987) and Smith et al. (1988). A more recent 
survey is Whitehead (1999). Miles (1994) offers a general treatment of housing and its connection to the wider 
economy. Olsen (1987) addresses econometric issues in housing market research. 
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Because of the importance of housing to household welfare and the economy as a whole, a 
number of different subsidies and regulations have been implemented with the aim of 
ensuring a reasonable housing standard for all households and promoting economic stability. 
This collection of studies deals with the most notable feature of the Finnish housing subsidy 
system which is the promotion of homeownership through tax subsidies i.e. indirectly through 
tax law. These provisions are the non-taxation of imputed rental income and capital gains, and 
the tax deductibility of mortgage interest. Since these tax subsidies are the largest form of 
housing subsidy in Finland, it is crucial to study whether they have the intended effect of 
promoting household welfare. If the provisions do not increase household welfare one should 
ask whether the provision are in place because of special interest group pressure or because 
current homeowners as voters are in a position to keep these provision in place.2 Because 
many countries offer similar tax subsidies to homeowners, the results from these studies 
should be of interest not only to Finnish academia and policy-makers but also internationally.  
 
The adverse effects of lenient tax treatment of owner-occupied housing are well documented 
in the economics literature. First of all, lenient taxation of housing induces households to 
consume more housing, and thus, increases the existing housing stock at the expense of other 
productive or business capital stock in the economy. This misallocation of capital resources 
may lead to slower economic growth and reduced living standards in the long run. For 
example, Gervais (2002) uses a dynamic general equilibrium model and finds that taxing 
imputed rental income at the same rate as business capital would substantially increase the 
stock of business capital and decrease the housing stock.3  
 
Second, because of imperfect capital markets households’ life-cycle consumption profile is 
distorted as households need to save for a down-payment when buying a house. Lenient 
taxation promotes this by making homeownership artificially cheap, and thus, encouraging 
households to save at a young age when their income is low, which is not optimal from 
consumption smoothing point of view.  
                                                 
2 Using a calibrated general equilibrium model, Eerola and Määttänen (2006) find that a median voter has a large 
share of her wealth in housing (the model is calibrated to U.S. household data), and thus, is reluctant to vote for a 
revenue neutral tax reform that imposes a higher tax on housing and a lower tax on business capital even when 
this implies a rise in the wage rate.  
3 Other studies that analyse the efficiency aspects of taxing owner-occupied housing include among others 
Berkovec and Fullerton (1992), Poterba (1992) and Skinner (1996).  
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Third, households are encouraged to hold portfolios that are not optimally diversified. 
Homeowners’ wealth is usually tied to a single risky asset that is often debt-financed. This 
position exposes homeowners to a background risk which may discourage them from taking 
additional financial risk when compiling their asset portfolios.4 Furthermore, Berkovec and 
Fullerton (1992) argue that taxing capital gains from owner-occupied housing would raise 
welfare also because through taxation (with full loss offset) the government takes part of the 
risk involved with individual properties. This is possible because house price movements may 
not be synchronised across regions. When full loss offset is permitted taxation reduces 
potential losses and gains at household level and distributes them nationally allowing the 
government to diversify away the local house price risk.5  
 
On the other hand, the main argument in favour of subsidising owner-occupied housing is that 
it creates positive externalities. These externalities may be manifested on two margins. First, 
homeownership in itself may create externalities, and second, externalities may arise from 
housing consumption in general. This is an important distinction because it affects the choice 
of optimal policy instruments. For example, should the government subsidise low-income 
households so that they can make the transition to homeownership, or should it promote 
housing consumption in general? These issues are discussed more thoroughly in the latter part 
of this chapter.  
 
This introductory chapter serves as a background for Chapters 2–4. It starts with a short 
overview of Finnish housing market development and policy. Then it discusses the basic 
aspects of households’ tenure choice concentrating on agency problems involved with 
different tenure modes that may justify their different tax treatment. Furthermore, it covers 
various reasons proposed in the economics and popular literature on why homeownership 
should be favoured through public policy compared to renting. The usual argument in this 
literature in favour of subsidising owner-occupied housing is that housing consumption and 
                                                 
4 Flavin and Yamashita (2002) showed using historical asset return data from the U.S. that a mean-variance 
efficient portfolio of highly leveraged homeowners includes clearly a lower share of stocks compared to 
homeowners without leverage. Brueckner (1997) offers an analytic presentation of the result. 
5 Sheffrin and Turner (2001) quantify this effect using U.S. data. They find, however, that homeowners are less 
well-off under a capital gains tax with full offset than under the current U.S. tax system of no capital gains taxes. 
However, this aspect may not be so important in Finland where house price movements actually have been quite 
synchronised across regions, although the capital region has exhibited sharper price swings.      
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 homeownership in particular create positive externalities. This chapter also reviews shortly 
empirical literature on evidence for such externalities and contrasts these findings on the 
current tax treatment of owner-occupied housing in Finland.  
 
The main contribution of the dissertation is in chapters 2–4. These chapters include three 
individual empirical studies that address owner-occupied housing and its taxation from 
different points of view. Chapter 2 analyses the tax incentives for mortgage demand. In 1993 
a major tax reform was implemented in Finland which changed the tax deduction rates of 
mortgage interest, and thus, changed households’ incentives to borrow. The chapter studies 
whether households have responded to these changes. Chapter 3 connects owner-occupied 
housing and mortgage debt into a broader context of household portfolio choice. The chapter 
presents empirical evidence on whether owner-occupied housing has an adverse effect on the 
amount of stocks in a household’s portfolio. Chapter 4 is concerned with the largest 
individual housing subsidy in Finland which is the non-taxation of imputed rental income. 
The chapter estimates the size of the subsidy and analyses its effects on household income 
distribution. This chapter also assesses which type of households would gain or lose if the 
subsidy was eliminated.  
 
The rest of the introductory chapter is organised as follows. Next section of this introductory 
chapter provides background information on Finnish housing market development and policy. 
Section 3 presents the main aspects of household’s tenure choice. Section 4 discusses the 
main reasons proposed in favour of lenient taxation of owner-occupied housing and presents 
some empirical findings from the literature. The final section provides a summary of the main 
results of chapters 2–4.  
 
2   Finnish housing markets and policy: an overview 
 
The government is heavily involvement in housing markets in Finland through a variety of 
taxes, subsidies and various forms of regulation. This section shortly reviews the main aspects 
and recent history of Finnish housing policy.6 Up until the mid 1990s, Finnish housing 
markets were subject to a high degree of regulation. The owner-occupied housing sector was 
                                                 
6 Loikkanen and Lönnqvist (2007) offer a more thorough overview of the development of housing markets and 
institutions in Finland and in the Helsinki metropolitan area in particular. See Bengs and Loikkanen (1991) for a 
review of earlier developments. 
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 regulated indirectly through financial market regulation and private rental markets were 
subject to rent control. However, the past 20 years have been a time of deregulation. In the 
late 1980’s, financial markets were liberalised. Before the liberalisation interest rates were 
regulated which led to negative real interest rates and credit rationing. Borrowing for the 
purpose of house purchase required heavy up-front saving from the households and mortgage 
maturities were relatively short, less than 10 years. The improved availability of mortgage 
loans and longer repayment periods released the excess demand created by financial 
regulation which together with rapid economic growth triggered a boom in house prices in the 
late 1980s. House prices busted as the economy went into a deep recession in the early 1990’s 
and have been increasing again rapidly since the late 1990’s as result of economic recovery, 
low interest rates and migration.7 Further deregulation took place in the mid 1990s when rent 
controls were abolished from new rental contracts in 1992 and were phased out totally by 
1995.8
 
One of the main features of Finnish housing policy is lenient taxation of owner-occupied 
housing. Since the tax reform of 1993 the income tax system in Finland is a so-called dual 
income tax system where capital and labour income are divided as different types of income 
and are taxed with different tax rates. Capital income is taxed with a flat rate, currently at 28 
percent, whereas labour income is taxed with a progressive rate. When compared to landlords, 
the Finnish tax system offers three major concessions for households living in owner-
occupied dwellings:9
 
1. non-taxation of imputed rental income, 
2. non-taxation of capital gains from the sale of an owner-occupied dwelling, if the 
taxpayer or her family has used it as their primary dwelling (home) for at least two 
consecutive years, and 
3. deductibility of interest on a loan taken for the purpose of home purchase or 
improvement (a mortgage loan).10 
 
                                                 
7 See Kalela et al. (2001) for more details on the Finnish recession and recovery. 
8 For further details on the Finnish rent control system see Lyytikäinen (2006)  
9 Finland is not an exception internationally in this respect. See e.g. Englund (2003). A further tax subsidy to 
housing in Finland is the non-taxation of the low-income housing allowances, which is not covered here. 
10 To be precise, in Finland house loans are not assumable mortgages but personal loans. However, most Finnish 
house loans are secured by a home. 
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 It is important to note that the deductibility of mortgage interest can be seen as a tax subsidy 
only because the corresponding income (imputed rent and capital gains) is untaxed. If 
imputed rents and capital gains were taxed, interest payments should be seen as an expense 
from producing taxable income and deductibility should not be regarded as a tax subsidy. 
This is the case with landlords; they pay taxes on rental income and capital gains but are 
allowed to deduct interest expenses from this income before the tax is levied. Furthermore, 
both homeowners and landlords are required to pay a municipal property tax. 
 
Due to these provisions in the tax code, the government loses significant amounts of tax 
revenue. The Government Institute for Economic Research estimated that in 2006 the tax 
revenues forgone from the non-taxation of imputed rental income and capital gains were 1.8 
billion and 0.9 billion euros, respectively. The tax revenue forgone through mortgage interest 
deductibility was roughly 0.5 billion. At the same time, the overall government tax revenue 
collected through income and wealth taxes was about 12 billion euros. These figures do not 
take into account behavioural responses from the households if an actual tax reform is 
implemented but they should give an idea about the magnitude of the issues under scrutiny.  
 
Although imputed rental income is not taxed in Finland currently, it has been subject to 
taxation for the most part of the post World War II period. Before 1974 imputed rental 
income was determined according to local rent level or some predetermined rate of return on 
assessed house value. The valuation principles varied between regions and the assessed values 
were set so low that the practical meaning of the tax was very small for most taxpayers. In 
1974 the tax on imputed rental income was relieved even further. Imputed rental income 
became untaxed on part of the house value below a certain limit. Again the assessed tax 
values were set well below market values and in practise only very large or luxurious 
dwellings were subject to the tax. Tax values were later increased to resemble market values 
more closely. For example, Bengs and Loikkanen (1991) report that in 1981 only 38,000 
taxpayers paid taxes on imputed rental income, whereas in 1985 the number was more than 
100,000. Finally, the tax on imputed rental income was abolished altogether as part of a major 
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 tax reform in 1993.11 At the same time, a municipal property tax was introduced that is levied 
on all property owners, landlords and homeowners alike.12  
 
In addition to tax subsidies to all homeowners, the government subsidises housing through 
housing allowances targeted to low income households. The allowances are not tied to tenure, 
but most of the recipients live in rental dwellings.13 Students and pensioners have their own 
allowance systems besides the general housing allowance. The overall amount paid out 
through these allowances was about 1 billion euros in 2007.  
 
Besides direct allowances and tax subsidies, the government offers subsidised loans to 
municipalities and non-profit building companies to provide social housing.14 These loans can 
be used either to build new housing or to purchase dwellings from the existing housing 
stock.15 The owners of the dwellings financed through subsidised loans are required to 
comply with statutes governing tenant selection and they are only allowed to charge rents 
corresponding to capital expenditure and maintenance costs (known as cost recovery rent). 
The tenants for subsidised rental dwellings are selected on the basis of social suitability and 
financial need. In terms of household income, tenants living in subsidised units are less well 
off than the population as a whole. However, according to a recent assessment of the Finnish 
housing finance and subsidy system, 73 percent of Finnish households were eligible for a 
subsidised unit.16 Although the importance of social housing construction has diminished in 
the recent past, social housing still constitutes about 15 percent of the total housing stock. 
This is partly due to a history of rent controls on free market rental units. During the era of 
rent control majority of new rental housing was provided through subsidised construction.  
 
                                                 
11 The tax reform is described more closely in Chapter 2. 
12 Already before 1993, some municipal user charges were based on assessed tax value of the house. These were 
also replaced by the property tax. For details of the property tax in Finland see Lyytikäinen (2007).  
13 Lyytikäinen (2008) provides details of the general housing allowance and the economic incentives it creates to 
households.  
14 These consist mostly of the so-called ARAVA loans. There is also a similar interest subsidy scheme besides 
the ARAVA scheme. We will not make a further distinction here because of the similarity of the two schemes.  
15 The dwellings are either rental or right of occupancy dwellings. Previously also homeowners were eligible for 
ARAVA loans. However, this policy ended in 1997. Nowadays, low-income homeowners are eligible for a 
separate interest subsidy scheme where the government pays part of the interest payments when the interest rate 
exceeds a certain limit. During recent times of low interest rates, the practical meaning of this subsidy has been 
small. 
16 See Ministry of the Environment (2002). 
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 In addition to providing social housing, municipalities are strong actors in Finnish housing 
markets due to their zoning monopoly on the land in their area. Furthermore, municipalities 
set the property tax rates, although they have to comply with quite narrow limits set by the 
central government.  
 
3   Housing tenure choice 
 
A household’s tenure choice involves a simultaneous choice of the amount of housing 
services to consume and the allocation of its asset portfolio. Arnott (1987) argues that in a 
perfectly competitive economy, a household’s consumption and portfolio composition 
decisions are separable. In this case, it makes no difference whether a household owns or 
rents because by purchasing other assets a household can achieve same state-contingent 
consumption possibilities under both tenure modes.  
 
However, as Arnott (1987) points out, in reality owner-occupied and rental housing differ on 
several dimensions. First, homeowners face higher transaction costs associated with moving 
than renters.17 Second, homeowners enjoy a greater security of tenure compared to renters. 
Third, unlike renting homeownership involves a portfolio decision on the part of the 
household; not only is a house a major capital asset, in most cases a mortgage is needed to 
finance the purchase. As Henderson and Ioannides (1983) argue one must distinguish 
consumption demand for housing services and investment demand for housing capital. 
Fourth, homeowners are exposed to an asset price risk, and possibly, an interest rate risk, 
whereas renter households face a rent risk.18 Fifth, because of imperfect capital markets 
prospective homeowners need to save for a down-payment in order to qualify for a mortgage. 
This also exposes these renter households to a house price risk due to house price fluctuations 
and timing of their future house purchase. Sixth, homeowners and landlords are taxed 
differently, which may create a wedge between the user-cost faced by a homeowner and the 
rent faced by a renter household living in a similar dwelling. For the above reasons, we 
observe some empirical regularities in housing markets. For example, wealthier and high-
                                                 
17 Usually, it is assumed that homeowners face greater transaction costs due to, for example, realtor fees. In 
Finland homeowners also have to pay a transfer tax when they buy a house. The tax depends on property type.  
First-time buyers under the age of 40 are relieved from paying the tax. Also landlords have to pay the transfer 
tax.  
18 See Sinai and Souleles (2005).  
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 income households are more likely to own and households with shorter expected stays are 
more likely to rent.  
 
A typical way of comparing the two tenure modes from a household’s point of view is to 
make net present value calculations of cash-flows to see which tenure type is the cheaper 
option for a given length of residence spell.19 Some studies of tenure choice concentrate on 
agency costs related to renting. Henderson and Ioannides (1983) emphasise the “fundamental 
rental externality” that arises from the fact that landlords are unable to observe the tenants 
utilisation rate (the tear and wear tenants inflict on the dwelling).20 Thus, the rents cannot 
accurately reflect the utilisation rate, which leads to inefficient levels of utilisation by renters 
because they do not bear the full cost of utilisation they inflict on the dwelling.  
 
Miceli (1989) uses a stylised model to address this issue. He abstracts from many traditional 
explanations for the tenure choice decision and concentrates on the asymmetric information 
problem raised by Henderson and Ioannides (1983). In his model, tenure choice is driven by 
an adverse selection mechanism in the rental market and transaction costs associated with 
homeownership. Given two types of households that differ according to their utilisation rate 
(high and low), Miceli finds that when landlords are unable to observe the household type the 
low types strictly prefer owning to renting and the high types remain indifferent. This is 
because landlords are forced to collect rents that cover their opportunity cost and the average 
utilisation costs inflicted by the tenants. Adding transaction costs incurred by homeowners in 
this model changes this so that now the high types strictly prefer renting and low types’ 
choice depends on the comparison of the suboptimal rental contract that they are offered and 
the transaction cost incurred if they own. At a given utilisation level, there is a transaction 
cost above which low types will rent and below which they will own. In addition, in Miceli’s 
model in their respective optimum low types who own will always consume more housing 
than low types who rent. Miceli’s model shows that asymmetric information leads to an 
inefficient equilibrium where some households consume less than the optimal amount of 
housing.  
 
                                                 
19 An example is Mills (1990) who calculates occupancy times needed to justify owner-occupancy in the U.S.  
20 More precisely, landlords are unable to observe the utilisation rate ex ante and are also unable to fully charge 
the tear and wear from the tenants ex post.  
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 In addition to transaction costs, homeownership may be undesirable or unattainable for some 
households because houses can be bought only in large bundles and often require a down-
payment for a mortgage. Furthermore, a substantial share of a homeowner household’s wealth 
is tied to a single risky asset creating a risky asset portfolio. As Brueckner (1997) shows 
households have to balance the disutility from an undiversified portfolio and the disutility of 
paying high rents when making their tenure decision.  
 
The problem of inefficient utilisation is not limited to rental markets, however. Due to the fact 
that houses usually outlive their owners, or their residence spells, homeowners (the same way 
as renters) may not have incentives to take socially optimal care of their houses, because 
prospective buyers are not able to perfectly monitor the condition of the house.21 In other 
words, homeowners may not fully internalise the cost of utilisation because they are not the 
sole claimants of the market value of the house. This phenomenon is coined as the “resale 
externality” in the housing economics literature.22 Ben-Shahar (2004) argues that when a 
seller has better information than the buyer on the quality of the house, the seller may use 
improvement and maintenance as signals of house quality. Although the signal itself is 
productive, inefficient overinvestment is possible in Ben-Shahar’s framework given 
asymmetric information. Furthermore, if sellers can perfectly fake an investment in house 
improvement (which is unproductive), the fake investment is a dominating strategy and leads 
to a waste of resources.  
 
Linneman (1985) introduces the notion of relative landlord efficiency in producing housing 
services. Linneman argues that there are reasons why, in some instances, landlords are more 
efficient than homeowners in producing housing services from a given structure. Particularly 
in multifamily units and densely populated residential areas landlords’ production costs may 
be substantially lower than those of homeowners. This is manifested, for example, through 
more efficient maintenance of common facilities and through lower bargaining costs in the 
case of externalities or disputes among tenants. On the other hand, a landlord-tenant 
relationship is a bilateral agreement that encourages opportunistic behaviour from both 
parties. Because it is expensive or even impossible to include all contingencies into a rental 
contract, there is an incentive to internalise these costs through vertical integration, i.e. 
                                                 
21 This is a classic problem of lemons. See Akerlof (1970).  
22 Harding et al. (2000) find no empirical evidence on resale externality in the U.S. housing markets, whereas 
Iwata and Yamaga (2007) find such evidence from Japanese housing markets.  
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 through homeownership. Linneman suggests that different types of housing markets have 
differing degrees of relative landlords efficiency, and also, differing degrees of 
homeownership when other factors are controlled for.  
 
Indeed, Linneman’s proposition is, at least partly, confirmed by Table 1 where Finnish 
housing stock is classified in terms of housing tenure and structure type in 2004. From Table 
1 we see that single family detached houses are rarely rented. However, a large percentage of 
apartments in row houses and even in multi-storey blocks are owner-occupied. This is partly 
due to a more lenient tax treatment of owner-occupied housing compared to rental housing. If 
Linneman’s arguments are valid, general tax subsidies to owner-occupied housing may lead 
to tenure modes that are inefficient in particular housing structures. Table 1 also hints that part 
of the households’ choice to become homeowners is tied to the demand for single-family 
houses, which offer more privacy, bigger yards and other amenities not available in multi-
family units. 
 
Table 1. Finnish housing stock according to tenure and structure type in 2004. 




Single family detached house 38.3 % 94.7 %
wo-family detached house 3.4 % 69.5 %
Row house 15.7 % 63.4 %
ulti-storey block 41.7 % 41.6 %
ource: Author's calculations from the 2004 Wealth Survey produced by Statistics Finland. Sampling 













4   Why subsidise owner-occupied housing? 
 
The main argument in favour of subsidising owner-occupied housing is that it creates positive 
externalities. The tax subsidies related to housing affect households’ decisions on two 
margins. First, they affect the choice of renting versus owning, and second, they affect the 
level of housing consumption. It is often argued that both of these decisions involve 
externalities. Next, we will consider these margins in turn in the light of the current tax 
subsidies in Finland. 
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 4.1   Externalities from homeownership 
 
There are various reasons why homeownership might create externalities. First, homeowners 
own an asset that’s value is tied to the quality of their community. This creates incentives for 
homeowners to engage and vote for activities that makes their community more attractive, 
and thus, increases the value of their property. Renters, on the other hand, may lack these 
incentives because a more attractive community leads to higher rents and the direct benefits to 
renters from improving their community may be less than the increase in rents. Furthermore, 
homeowners tend to favour longer-term investments because they are most likely to capitalise 
in house values.23 However, some of the activities engaged by homeowners may also create 
negative externalities. For example, Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) argue that homeowners are 
more likely to oppose new residential building close to their property, and to hinder 
minorities’ chances to move into their community. Oswald (1999) points out that local 
political power groups consisting of homeowners may also discourage business start-ups 
through tighter zoning and planning laws the same way as they may hinder new residential 
development.  
 
Homeownership also creates barriers to mobility because homeowners face substantially 
higher transaction costs than renters. A high ownership-rate and reduced household mobility 
may create inefficiencies in the labour market. Oswald (1999), among others, has argued that 
reduced mobility leads to higher unemployment mainly for two reasons. First, because of high 
transaction costs homeowners are less likely to move after employment. Second, a high 
ownership-rate naturally translates into low turnover in the rental market because the number 
of rental units is low. This reduces mobility of the labour force in general. Not only is this 
likely to lead to a higher unemployment rate, but also, it may lead to a situation where people 
work in jobs that are not ideally suited for them. Thus, increased unemployment is not so 
much due to homeowners themselves being more unemployed, but instead, unemployed 
people are less mobile than in a society where free market renting is more prevalent. High 
transaction costs are internalised by homeowners and, as such, do not create externalities. 
However, higher unemployment may increase the overall tax burden in an economy through, 
for example, higher unemployment benefits.  
                                                 
23 See DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) for a simple model of investment in local amenities and public goods that 
demonstrate these results.  
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Of course, as pointed out by Glaeser and Shapiro (2002), durability of housing and short run 
spatial fixity of the housing stock means that even if the society is completely made up of 
renters, mobility is possible in the short run only through exchange of workers between areas. 
That is, increased mobility is not an answer to a local temporary downturn because the 
households who flee the area must find housing in the new location. On the other hand, 
reduced mobility may also be beneficial because it creates incentives to invest in social 
capital, to connect to local community and to gain knowledge of important local issues. 
Furthermore, children may benefit from a more stable living environment.  
 
Oswald (1999) also recognises that homeowners commute much more and longer distances 
than renters which contributes to congestion, and thus, induces a cost to all traffic users. This 
aspect has a lot to do with the house structure type that homeowners demand. Usually, single-
family houses are not up for rent and owning is the only option for households with 
preference for this type of housing. Furthermore, single family houses are more or less always 
situated on the fringe part of an urban area. So in effect, a subsidy targeted at owner-occupied 
housing creates incentives to choose single family housing.  
 
Finally, homeowners may take better care of their property than renters or landlords. 
However, due to the fact that houses usually outlive their owners, homeowners (the same way 
as renters) may not have sufficient incentives to take socially optimal care of their houses, 
because prospective buyers are not able to perfectly monitor the condition of the house. It 
may be that homeowners do not bear the full cost of their utilisation, but instead, they partly 
pass it on to future owners.  
 
4.2   Externalities from housing consumption 
 
Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) list three main positive externalities that might arise from housing 
consumption. First, a sufficiently poor standard of housing may create fire risks and advance 
the spreading of diseases. Furthermore, deterioration of buildings may agglomerate and create 
slums which may breed crime, for example. Second, better housing may create aesthetic 
amenities that benefit one’s neighbours or even casual passers-by. Third, housing may 
increase the well-being of children.  
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Clearly, the first externality is not very relevant in today’s Finland or most industrialised 
countries. However, since policies tend to be path-dependent, it is worth at least to entertain 
the notion that part of the justification for large scale housing subsidies still stems from such 
considerations. Nonetheless, it seems that a general tax subsidy to all homeowners is a 
particularly cost-inefficient way of reducing sub-standard housing. Surely, building standards, 
zoning laws and targeted allowances are better suited for this aim.  
 
The second externality is based on the fact that when an individual improves her property it 
increases in value. However, the improvement may also increase the value of neighbouring 
properties. When making the investment decision, the individual takes into account only the 
value increase in her own property not the surrounding ones, and thus, the marginal social 
benefits from the improvement exceed the marginal private costs.24 Of course, it’s difficult to 
draw a line on when an improvement creates externalities only through aesthetics and when 
the improvement raises housing standards. It is clear, though, that not all improvements create 
aesthetic externalities. As Rosen (1985) remarks, painting outside walls creates spill-over 
effects, whereas painting interior walls does not. Furthermore, because people’s tastes are 
heterogeneous it is also possible that aesthetic improvements may, in fact, create negative 
externalities. Also, as pointed out by Glaeser and Shapiro (2002), excessively fancy homes 
may provoke envy. Relating the discussion again to general tax subsidies that are in place in 
Finland, it seems clear that they do not fulfil the criteria of a Pigouvian subsidy. The usual 
Pigouvian argument is that subsidies should be targeted directly at those activities that create 
positive externalities (Rosen, 1985).  
 
The third externality, benefits to children, can be justified if the society in general cares more 
about the well-being of children relative to parents, or that the family member in charge of 
housing decisions does not take into account the well-being of all family members, children in 
particular. However, it seems that these goals can be reached more easily by giving poor 
households a housing subsidy that does not depend on housing tenure.  
 
                                                 
24 Ioannides (2002) finds that homeowners’ maintenance decisions are positively affected by the maintenance 
decisions of their neighbours. This suggests that individual maintenance decisions may bring about 
improvements in the whole neighbourhood through a social multiplier effect.  
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 As was already pointed out earlier, housing consumption may also create negative 
externalities. Naturally, any efficiency losses created by distortive taxation are larger if the 
favoured activity also creates negative externalities. Voith (2001) has argued that subsidising 
housing consumption encourages people to live outside city centre where lot sizes, and thus, 
houses are larger. If households, and especially rich households, do indeed move away from 
the city, this may have a negative effect on the households who remain in the city. Glaeser 
and Shapiro (2002) argue that if a subsidy creates incentives to consume more housing mainly 
for the rich, it leads to more segregation by the rich. That is, rich households tend to sort more 
into rich neighbourhoods.  
 
4.3   Empirical evidence on externalities 
 
Credible empirical evidence on these issues is scarce, largely due to econometric problems in 
identification. For example, DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) find, using data from the U.S. and 
Germany, that homeownership is correlated with various indicators of social involvement, 
such as membership in non-professional organisations and local politics. However, they point 
out that causal interpretations of their results are inappropriate because of endogeneity 
problems.  
 
Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) study a number of externalities and find very little evidence of 
positive externalities related to housing consumption. They do find some evidence of positive 
externalities from homeownership but most of their results suffer from poor identification. 
Dietz and Haurin (2003) review the empirical literature on social and private micro-level 
consequences of homeownership.25 They find that the most solid result from the literature is 
that homeownership has a positive effect on various child outcomes. However, the main 
conclusion that they draw is that there are still huge gaps in the research agenda on the effects 
of homeownership, and that existing studies are plagued with econometric and statistical 
problems, such as endogeneity of key variables. For example, the problem with studying the 
effects of homeownership on child outcomes is establishing a credible causal link. It may be 
that children of homeowners do better than children of renters not because their parents are 
homeowners, but simply because their parents are different from the renter parents. If these 
                                                 
25 Haurin et al. (2003) review the literature on the effects of neighbourhood homeownership rates. However, the 
policy perspective of their survey concentrates more on the optimal mix of different tenures in neighbourhoods 
and whether it is beneficial to cluster or disperse homeowners within a given geographical area.  
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 differences are unobservable, a regression explaining some child outcome variable suffers 
from an omitted variables problem making the homeownership dummy endogenous.  
 
Munch et al. (2006) find empirical evidence that homeownership does hinder mobility of 
Danish households, but increases the chances of finding a local job. Furthermore, Munch et 
al. (2008) find that homeownership has a negative effect on job-to-job mobility both in local 
jobs and jobs outside the local labour market. On the other hand, they find that 
homeownership has a negative effect on unemployment risk and a positive effect on wages. 
However, these effects are private in nature and cannot be used as arguments in favour of a 
Pigouvian subsidy to homeownership. Green and Hendershott (2001) use state level panel 
data from the U.S. and find that homeownership seems to hinder mobility of middle age-
classes (35–64), and thus, leads to higher unemployment. They are also vary of interpreting 
this as a causal mechanism because of possible sorting of households across states. Pehkonen 
(1999) finds tentative evidence on the positive link between regional homeownership and 
unemployment using Finnish data.  
 
Another way of looking for external effects of homeownership is to see whether house prices 
are higher in neighbourhoods with high ownership rates. Coulson et al. (2003a and 2003b) 
find that house prices are indeed higher in neighbourhoods with high ownership rates. 
However, even if the results cited here truly have a causal interpretation, it is far from clear 
that a general tax subsidy to homeowners is the best way to subsidise the aspects that create 
positive externalities. For example, Green and White (1997) argue that instead of giving tax 
subsidies to all homeowners, more targeted policies toward low-income households would be 
more cost-effective in promoting homeownership.  
 
4.4   Administrative efficiency 
 
Often the taxation of homeownership and especially of imputed rental income is seen 
impossible because of the difficulties in assessing this implicit income. Furthermore, an often 
heard argument is that if we start taxing housing services from owner-occupied housing we 
should also start taxing services from owned cars and other durable consumption goods.26 
                                                 
26 See Aaron (1970) for a more general discussion. 
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 Even though this argument is correct in principle, it misses an important point, which is that a 
well-functioning tax system is also one that has low administrative costs.  
 
Valuation of the service stream from various durable goods would be administratively costly. 
And even though a different tax treatment of rented and owned durables creates efficiency 
losses, taxing the service stream from all consumer durables would most likely not be 
efficient. However, owner-occupied housing seems to be the one case that is an exception, 
given the scale of the housing stock, and thus, the scale of the created efficiency loss to the 
economy, and available assessment methods for tax valuations. This suggests that the tax 
subsidies to owner-occupied housing cannot be justified using administrative efficiency 
arguments.  
 
5   Overview of the dissertation 
 
The above discussion serves as a background for the main part of the dissertation. The issues 
raised so far are important aspects of households’ tenure choice and housing consumption 
decisions, and must be taken into account when assessing optimal housing policies. We now 
turn to the main part of the dissertation.  
 
Chapters 2–4 include three individual empirical studies that address owner-occupied housing 
and its taxation from different points of view. Chapter 2 analyses the demand for mortgage 
debt. Mortgage interest deductibility lowers the effective price of mortgage debt and therefore 
should increase households’ demand for it. In 1993 a major tax reform was implemented in 
Finland which changed the tax deduction rates of mortgage interest, and thus, changed 
households’ incentives to borrow. The chapter studies whether households have responded to 
these changes. 
 
Chapter 3 connects owner-occupied housing and mortgage debt into a broader context of 
household portfolio choice. Because of lenient taxation of owner-occupied housing, 
households are more likely to become homeowners and households’ portfolios contain more 
housing capital than they otherwise would. This exposure to a single risky asset that is often 
leveraged may affect a household’s willingness to take the additional financial risks. Chapter 
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 3 provides econometric evidence on whether owner-occupied housing and leveraged housing 
capital in particular has an adverse effect on homeowners’ demand for stocks. 
 
Chapter 4 is concerned with the size of the tax subsidy resulting from non-taxation of imputed 
rental income and the way it is distributed among households. According to empirical 
evidence reviewed above, efficiency aspects alone cannot justify the large tax subsidies 
related to owner-occupied housing. Chapter 4 analyses whether distributional arguments can 
be used to defend the subsidies. The results from this chapter can also be used to assess which 
type of households would gain or lose if the subsidy was eliminated. Short summaries of 
chapters 2–4 follow. 
 
Chapter 2: Tax Incentives and Demand for Mortgage Debt: Evidence from the Finnish 
1993 Tax Reform 
 
Previous studies from different countries show that the extent of tax deductibility of interest 
expenses has major implications for households’ borrowing behaviour. This chapter utilises a 
major tax reform implemented in Finland in 1993 to analyse the demand for mortgage debt by 
Finnish households. The tax reform significantly reduced the incentives to use debt financing 
in home acquisition for high-income households. Before the reform, mortgage interest was 
deductible according to a progressive tax schedule creating a so-called upside-down effect, 
which means that the benefit from the deduction was the greater the higher was the taxpayer’s 
income. After the reform, the deduction is made according to a flat schedule and the benefit 
no longer depends on taxpayer’s income.  
 
Basically, one can distinguish three groups of taxpayers that were differently affected by the 
reform. First, for low-income taxpayers, i.e. those in lower tax brackets, the subsidy resulting 
from mortgage interest deduction was slightly increased. Thus, for low-income taxpayers the 
incentive to borrow was also increased. Second, taxpayers in the middle tax brackets were 
(virtually) unaffected by the reform. And finally, for high-income taxpayers the subsidy was 
reduced and so was their incentive to borrow. This setting can be seen as a natural 
experiment, where one can distinguish multiple treatment groups and a control group. The 
treatment groups include households, who were affected by the reform and the control group 
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 are those, who were unaffected. This grouping is the basis of the analysis and enables the use 
of the difference-in-difference technique. 
 
In Chapter 2, household level repeated cross-section data from the 1990–2000 Income 
Distribution Surveys of Statistics Finland is used to study whether Finnish households 
responded to these changed incentives to borrow. The results suggest that high income 
households with high marginal tax rates have clearly responded to the reduced tax incentives 
by reducing their mortgage borrowing. The results remain robust after controlling for 
observable household characteristics and to several sensitivity tests based on sub-samples of 
the data.  
 
Furthermore, since the construction of the control and treatment groups was somewhat 
arbitrary, an alternative identification strategy was used which does not suffer from this 
problem. The second strategy is based on the notion that under a progressive tax and 
deduction schedule taxable income affects mortgage demand in two ways. First, because 
housing is a normal good an increase in income should lead to an increase in housing demand 
and consequently in mortgage demand. Second, under a progressive tax schedule an increase 
in income leads to a higher marginal tax rate and effectively lowers the after-tax price of 
mortgage debt. Consequently, higher income leads to higher mortgage demand due to this 
price effect as well. From a cross-section analysis it is very difficult to identify these effects. 
However, after the tax reform the after-tax price of mortgage debt is the same for all taxpayers 
regardless of their income. Therefore, with cross-section data from both before and after the 
reform the impact of the tax-price effect can be identified. This alternative strategy also lent 
strong support for the difference-in-differences results.  
 
Chapter 3: Owner-occupied Housing and Demand for Risky Financial Assets: Some 
Finnish Evidence 
 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation studies the linkage between owner-occupied housing and 
households’ financial portfolio choice. Most of a homeowner’s wealth is usually tied to a 
single risky asset that is often debt financed. This exposes the household to a background risk 
that may affect the household’s desire to take additional risks in its financial decision-making. 
The first part of this chapter follows the example of Flavin and Yamashita (2002). It analyses, 
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 using a theoretical simulation model, how a leveraged position in owner-occupied housing 
affects a homeowner’s optimal portfolio choice under current investment environment in 
Finland.  
 
In the theoretical model, a household maximises expected utility of wealth with respect to 
holdings of financial assets conditional on the current value of its house and net wealth. The 
motivation for the model is that once a homeowner household commits itself to a particular 
level of housing consumption, the optimal adjustment interval may be very long because of 
adjustment costs. Obviously, the costs of adjusting the quantities of financial assets are 
smaller. The optimal portfolio mix depends on the expected return and variance of the 
portfolio, and household’s risk aversion parameter. Using Finnish asset return data from 
1995–2005, the maximisation problem is solved for different levels of household risk 
aversion and house value-to-net wealth ratio which captures the extent of the household’s 
exposure to house price risk. The results indicate that a leveraged position in housing has a 
clear negative effect on the share of stocks in a mean-variance efficient portfolio.  
 
The second part of the chapter studies how owner-occupied housing actually affects 
households’ financial portfolios using Finnish household data. The econometric results show 
that owner-occupied housing has an adverse effect on household stockholding. More 
precisely, a higher house value at a given level of net wealth clearly reduces the probability 
that a household enters the stock market. This result can be interpreted in two ways. First, at a 
given net wealth level higher house value exposes households to higher house price risk 
which might induce them to mitigate their stockholding. Second, higher house value at a 
given level of net wealth and mortgage debt automatically means a lower level of financial 
wealth for the household. So the result may indicate that some households do not see it 
worthwhile to enter the stock market given their low level of financial wealth and possible 
entry and participation costs. Although, the results hinted that the latter effect is more 
important, the relative importance of these two effects cannot be deduced explicitly from the 
data used.  
 
On the other hand, it seems that housing has only a small effect if any on the share of 
financial assets a household invests in stocks conditional on stockholding. However, the 
results concerning the share invested in stocks may suffer from a poorly identified model and 
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 should be taken only as suggestive. Further work is needed in this respect. What comes to 
other important factors behind stockholding, wealthier and more educated households are 
clearly more likely to own stocks and also invest a larger share of their financial wealth into 
stocks. 
 
Chapter 4: Imputed Rental Income, Taxation and Income Distribution in Finland 
 
Chapter 4 examines the effects of imputed rental income from owner-occupied housing on 
income distribution in Finland. It also considers the distributional effects of levying a tax on 
imputed rental income. As already mentioned earlier in this chapter, the adverse effects of 
lenient taxation of owner-occupied housing are well documented in the economics literature. 
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to evaluate whether the tax advantages can be justified from a 
distributional point of view.  
 
The first part of Chapter 4 discusses the notion of tenure neutrality in taxation. It illustrates 
the tax subsidy to homeowners under the current Finnish income tax system by comparing the 
tax treatment of homeowners and landlords. Because the Finnish income tax system is based 
on taxing net income, i.e. income net of expenses accrued from producing this income, this 
part also discusses the appropriate deductible items from gross imputed rental income.  
 
The empirical exercise in Chapter 4 is problematic because imputed rental income comes in 
non-monetary form as housing services, and thus, is unobservable to the researcher (and the 
tax authority). The chapter overcomes this problem by using a hedonic rent regression based 
on free market rents to predict imputed rental values for homeowners. These rental values are 
then used as the tax base for the new tax. The dataset used in this study is the 2004 Wealth 
Survey produced by Statistics Finland. This is a good dataset for the purposes of this study 
because it includes better location information than is usually found in Finnish national level 
household surveys, and thus, allows the estimation of more plausible hedonic models.  
 
A distributional analysis of the effects of moving to a tenure neutral tax system must include 
an assumption about how the increased tax revenue is distributed back to the economy so that 
the overall amount of government tax revenue stays constant. Two alternative ways are 
considered in Chapter 4. In the first scheme, the increased tax revenue was returned to all 
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 adult individuals as equal size lump-sum transfers. In the second scheme, the capital income 
tax rate was lowered so that the total tax revenue collected through the capital income tax 
stayed constant. Due to the nature of the data, conducting experiments with different tax rate 
cuts in labour income taxes was impossible, although this would probably be a more realistic 
alternative compared to the ones considered here. Furthermore, the calculations presented in 
this chapter ignore any behavioural responses from the households 
 
Main findings of Chapter 4 can be summarised as follows. The results indicate that owner-
occupied housing has a significant impact on the well-being of many households. In 2004 
imputed rental income constituted on average about 10.7 percent of homeowner households’ 
disposable income. The government also loses significant amounts of tax revenue because 
imputed rental income is untaxed. The estimated tax revenue forgone in 2004 was 1.9 billion 
euros. This amounts to almost 15 percent of the total government income and wealth tax 
revenue collected that year. Furthermore, the tax subsidy resulting from non-taxation of 
imputed rental income is skewed toward high-income households who are more likely to be 
homeowners and also more likely to own outright. However, also some low-income 
households are homeowners and they may find it difficult to cope with tax payments if a tax 
on imputed rental income is implemented.  
 
The effects on overall inequality depend vitally on the way the increased tax revenue is 
transferred back to the households. Under the lump-sum transfer per adult scheme income 
inequality decreased slightly compared to the current system, whereas under the lower capital 
income tax scheme inequality clearly increased. The results suggest that any attempt to reform 
the taxation of housing to a more tenure neutral direction should be accompanied by a 
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Tax Incentives and Demand for Mortgage Debt:  






The 1993 Finnish tax reform reduced the incentives to use mortgage financing in home 
acquisition for high-income households. Before the reform, mortgage interest was deductible 
according to a progressive schedule which meant that the benefit from the deduction was the 
greater the higher was the taxpayer’s marginal income tax rate. After the reform, the 
deduction is made according to a flat schedule and the benefit no longer depends on 
taxpayer’s marginal income tax rate. This setting can be seen as a natural experiment, where 
one can distinguish multiple treatment groups and a control group. This paper uses household 
level repeated cross-section data from before and after the reform to study whether Finnish 
households have responded to these changes in incentives to borrow. The results, based on the 
difference-in-differences technique, show that high income households with high marginal tax 
rates have responded to the reform by clearly reducing their mortgage borrowing compared to 
the control group. 
 
 
Keywords: mortgage interest deduction, tax incentives, natural experiment 


















 1   Introduction 
 
Mortgage interest deduction has always been a controversial housing policy tool. Over the 
years a variety of arguments have been stated in favour and against the provision. One of the 
main arguments by the opponents is that by eliminating the deduction the government can 
raise significant amounts of tax revenue.  Furthermore, it is argued that the subsidy does not 
increase housing consumption or reduce the budget share of households’ housing expenses as 
intended, but instead only inflates house prices. Finally, even if the deduction is successful in 
increasing housing consumption efficiency losses may emerge because of overinvestment in 
housing relative to a more neutral tax system. 
 
Although the above arguments may be valid, the nature of mortgage interest deduction is 
often misunderstood in public debate. The fundamental tax advantage that homeowners 
receive in Finland is not the deductibility of mortgage interest but non-taxation of imputed 
rental income and capital gains. The removal of mortgage interest deduction would not 
eliminate the fundamental tax advantage but would tilt the advantage in favour of those 
wealthy and high-income homebuyers who are less dependent on debt financing. In fact, the 
deductibility of mortgage interest can be seen as a way to extend the fundamental tax 
advantage to households who must rely on mortgage financing in order to purchase a home.27 
In any case, the implicit assumption behind the above arguments is that taxation truly 
influences homebuyers’ choice of financing. The purpose of this paper is to study whether 
this is in fact the case.  
 
The literature on the effects of taxation and interest subsidies on mortgage demand has grown 
steadily during the last 15 years or so. One branch of research has studied mortgage demand 
in the broader context of household portfolio choice. Studies concentrating on taxation 
include Agell and Edin (1990) using cross-sectional Swedish, and King and Leape (1998) 
using cross-sectional U.S. data. The results from these studies suggest that mortgage demand 
is indeed sensitive to marginal tax rates. The conclusion is strengthened by Agell et al. (1995) 
who find that limitations in the amount of interest eligible for deduction in Sweden have 
mitigated the effect of taxation on mortgage demand found earlier by Agell and Edin (1990).  
 
                                                 
27 See e.g. Woodward and Weicher (1989) and Hendershott et al. (2003). 
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 There are also a number of studies that explicitly focus on mortgage demand. In a series of 
papers, Jones (1993, 1994 and 1995) argues that the demand for owner-occupied housing is 
not a sufficient explanation for households’ mortgage demand. He argues that households 
with mortgage debt have two options for investing their savings. Either they can invest in 
non-housing assets or they can reduce their holdings of mortgage debt, which yields a return 
in form of saved interest expenses. The optimal saving plan is the one that offers highest risk-
adjusted return.28 Crucial to the decision is whether mortgage interest is tax deductible. Using 
U.S. and Canadian data Jones finds that non-housing portfolio considerations do play a major 
role in households’ mortgage decisions.29 Follain and Dunsky (1997) constrain their analyses 
on U.S. homeowners and concentrate on the difference between the costs of equity and debt 
financing a household faces, and on household’s itemisation status.30 Their results indicate 
that the demand for mortgage debt is sensitive to the difference in the after-tax costs of equity 
and debt financing, which suggests that the elimination of mortgage interest deduction would 
decrease mortgage demand substantially. Ling and McGill (1998) use a similar approach and 
find evidence that taxation is an important factor driving mortgage demand. 
 
Some studies have exploited tax reforms that created exogenous variation in the tax deduction 
rate of mortgage interest to deal with endogeneity problems. These include Maki (1996 and 
2001) using U.S., Hendershott et al. (2003) and Hendershott and Price (2006) using U.K., 
Fjærli (2004) and Sommervoll (2007) using Norwegian, Alan and Leth-Petersen (2006) using 
Danish and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2006) using Italian data. All but Jappelli and Pistaferri 
(2006) conclude that household behaviour is sensitive to changes in taxation. Jappelli and 
Pistaferri (2006) attribute their result to credit-rationing or to the lack of financial information 
and information about changes in the after-tax interest rate on the part of Italian households. 
Martins and Villanueva (2006) studied the effects of a reform on a program that subsidises 
mortgage interest payments of young and low-income Portuguese households. The reform 
introduced a ceiling on house value that could be financed through the program. Using the 
fact that the reform should affect mostly the behaviour of eligible households living in high-
                                                 
28 See also Brueckner (1994). 
29 However, Manchester and Poterba (1989) show that U.S. households who obtain second mortgages are on 
average less wealthy than other households with similar characteristics. Although their result is only suggestive, 
they argue that second mortgages are used primarily for consumption not portfolio diversification purposes. See 
also Moriizumi (2000) for more discussion and Japanese evidence. 
30 In the U.S., a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate affects the price of mortgage debt only if the taxpayer itemises its 
deductions. A taxpayer is allowed to itemise only if its overall amount deductions exceed a certain limit. 
Otherwise it has to take the standard deduction which is equal to all taxpayers. 
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 price regions as their identification assumption, they report clearly negative interest rate 
elasticities of the probability of obtaining a mortgage. Furthermore, they report substantial 
concentration of loan amounts of eligible individuals at the discontinuity points of their 
budget constraint created by the reform.  
 
This paper also takes advantage of a tax reform that changed the incentives to borrow of 
Finnish households. In 1993 the Finnish government introduced a dual income tax system, in 
which capital and labour income are divided as different types of income and are taxed with 
different tax rates. The new system replaced a progressive tax rate on all income with a flat 
rate on capital income and a separate progressive rate on labour income. Before the reform, 
mortgage interest was deductible according to a progressive schedule creating a so-called 
upside-down effect, which means that the value of the deduction subsidy was the greater the 
higher was the taxable income and the marginal income tax rate of the taxpayer. After the 
reform, mortgage interests are deductible according to a flat rate equal to the capital income 
tax rate. Thus, as a result of the reform, the link between taxpayer’s income and the after tax 
cost of mortgage debt was broken.  
 
We use household level repeated cross-section data from before and after the reform to study 
whether Finnish households have responded to these changes in incentives to borrow. One 
can distinguish three groups of taxpayers that were differently affected by the reform. First, 
for low-income taxpayers, i.e. those in lower tax brackets, the subsidy resulting from 
mortgage interest deduction was slightly increased. Thus, for low-income taxpayers the 
incentive to borrow was also increased. Second, taxpayers in the middle tax brackets were 
(virtually) unaffected by the reform. And finally, for high-income taxpayers the subsidy was 
reduced and so was their incentive to borrow. This setting can be seen as a natural 
experiment, where one can distinguish multiple treatment groups and a control group. The 
treatment groups include households, who were affected by the reform and the control group 
are those, who were unaffected. This grouping is the basis of our analysis and enables the use 
of the difference-in-difference technique. 
 
The results of the paper indicate that high income households with high marginal tax rates 
have responded to the reduced tax incentives by clearly reducing their mortgage borrowing. 
The results remain robust after controlling for observable household characteristics and to 
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 several sensitivity tests based on sub-samples of the data. Furthermore, since the construction 
of the control and treatment groups was somewhat arbitrary we used an alternative 
identification strategy which does not suffer from this problem. This alternative strategy also 
lent strong support for the difference-in-differences results.  
 
The results of this paper may be useful for other policy areas besides housing and mortgage 
markets. For example, the demographic development in many western countries has led 
governments to seek ways of increasing voluntary retirement savings. One way to do this is to 
create tax incentives for these purposes. When contemplating current tax incentive schemes or 
reforms of these schemes, it is of obvious importance to know whether households really 
respond to tax incentives.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, the central features of Finnish housing and 
mortgage markets, and the 1993 tax reform are outlined. This section also illustrates the effect 
of the 1993 tax reform on households’ incentives to borrow. In section 3, the empirical 
strategy is presented in more detail. In section 4, the data and estimation results are presented. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2   Finnish housing markets and the 1993 tax reform 
2.1   Background: Finnish housing markets and institutional changes  
 
When studying the effects of a particular reform one must account for other reforms and 
economic changes coinciding with it. Next we will shortly review the development of Finnish 
housing markets and institutions before and after the 1993 tax reform. In the latter part of the 
1980’s Finnish financial markets were liberalised. Before the liberalisation interest rates were 
regulated which led to negative real interest rates and credit rationing. Mortgage borrowing 
required heavy up-front saving from the households and annuities were relatively short.31 
Together with rapid economic growth the improved availability of mortgage loans and longer 
repayment periods triggered a boom in house prices, which can be seen in Figure 1. The 
house prices busted as the economy went into a deep recession in the early 1990’s and have 
                                                 
31 See Bengs and Loikkanen (1991) for an overview of earlier development of Finnish housing markets and 
institutions.   
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 been increasing again rapidly since the late 1990’s as result of economic recovery, low 
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Figure 1. Development of Finnish house prices in real terms, 1985–2001 (1983=100). 
Source: Statistics Finland. 
 
The recession made its mark also on the mortgage market. The banking sector was hit 
especially hard as collateral values collapsed and more and more businesses went bankrupt.33 
Figure 2 illustrates the development of the real mortgage stock of Finnish households and the 
average mortgage interest rate during the 1980’s and 1990’s. The high interest rates in the 
early 1990’s were due to an unsuccessful defence of a fixed exchange rate after which the 
Finnish Markka was devaluated by 12 percent in November 1991 and floated in September 
1992. The decline in the mortgage stock was a result of both declined demand for mortgage 
debt during the recession and a tightened lending policy by the banking sector as a reaction to 
credit-losses. 
 
                                                 
32 The Finnish GDP collapsed about 12 percent in 1991–1993. At the same time unemployment rate rose from 
3.5 percent in 1990 to 18.4 percent in 1994. See Kalela et al. (2001) for more details on the Finnish recession and 
recovery. 
33 In Finland there are only few financial firms concentrated on private housing finance. The biggest mortgage 
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Figure 2. Finnish mortgage stock and average mortgage interest rate in 1980–2000. 
Source: Statistics Finland. 
 
Although the liberalisation of financial markets increased mortgage availability in the long 
run, the ratio of mortgage stock to GDP in Finland is still relatively low in international 
comparisons. According to European Central Bank (2003) the ratio of mortgage stock to GDP 
in Finland was 21 percent in 2001.34 Homeownership is the dominant tenure in Finland. 
Figure 3 shows, how the ownership rate increased steadily throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s, 
reaching the high point of almost 75 percent in 1990. The main reasons behind this 
development have been the tax-favoured status of owner-occupied housing and a long history 
of rent control. In 1991–1995 rent controls were finally phased out. The removal has probably 
increased the availability of rental dwellings and affected the tenure choice of households. 
Homeownership rate declined from 75 percent in 1990 to about 68 percent in 2001. 
 
                                                 
34 According to the ECB (2003) mortgage stock to GDB ratio in 2001 was on average 33 percent in the Euro area 
and 39 percent in the EU. Highest ratios can be found in the Netherlands (74 percent), Denmark (67 percent) and 
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Figure 3. Housing Tenure shares in Finland, 1970–2001.  
Source: Statistics Finland. 
 
2.2   Tax reform and the incentive to borrow 
 
Before the 1993 tax reform in Finland income taxation was based on all nominal income 
regardless of the source (labour or capital). However, the effective tax rate on capital income 
from different assets varied considerably because of different concessions and exemptions. In 
particular, imputed rental income from owner-occupied housing was taxed only on the part of 
house value that exceeded a certain limit. In practice, most owner-occupiers did not pay any 
taxes on imputed rental income, mainly because houses were valued well below market rates. 
All this together with the possibility to deduct mortgage interest expenses according to a 
progressive schedule made mortgage debt a good way to pursue tax arbitrage goals especially 
for high-income taxpayers with high marginal tax rates. One of the main goals of the 1993 
reform was to harmonise the taxation of capital income from different assets by broadening 
the tax base and to eliminate tax arbitrage possibilities. This is clearly stated in the 
Government bill 200/1992 for the Income Tax Act. 
 
In 1993 the Finnish government introduced a dual income tax system, in which capital and 
labour income are divided as different types of income and are taxed with different tax rates. 
The new system replaced a progressive tax rate on capital income with a flat rate of 25 
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 percent, whereas labour income remained under a progressive schedule. In addition, the tax 
code was simplified by harmonising the deduction rules for different capital assets. In 1993, a 
new municipal property tax was also introduced, while the national tax on imputed rental 
income was abolished. At the same time some municipal-level payments on property such as 
the street maintenance fee, land tax and presumptive taxation of property were eliminated. In 
effect, the taxation of the return from owner-occupied housing remained unchanged due to 
these reforms. Landlords, in addition to being liable for the new property tax, continue to pay 
capital income taxes on rental income and capital gains they receive. So in effect, owner-
occupied housing is still clearly tax-favoured compared to rental housing in Finland. 
Furthermore, a stamp tax on interest income was phased in between 1991 and 1994, from 
where on the stamp tax rate has been equal to capital income tax rate.35  
 
In the Finnish tax system the deductibility of interest expenses is determined according to the 
purpose of use of the debt. Interest expenses that are deductible in Finland include interest on 
mortgage loans,36 interest on government secured student loans and interest expenses accrued 
from producing taxable income. Mortgage debt refers here only to acquisition debt, including 
construction and home improvement. Interest on loans taken for consumption purposes is not 
tax deductible even if primary residence is used as collateral. However, before the reform a 
limited amount of consumer credit interest was deductible. In the new system, interest 
expenses are deductible from capital income. Thus, the deduction rate is the same as the tax 
rate on capital income. If interest expenses exceed capital income, the taxpayer is allowed to 
deduct the resulting tax deficit from her labour income tax liability in form of a tax credit. In 
this situation the deduction rate is equal to the capital income tax rate, except first-time 
homebuyers are allowed to deduct the tax deficit resulting from mortgage interest at 30 






                                                 
35 The stamp tax on interest income was first introduced in 1991 when the rate was 10 percent. The rate was 
increased to 15 in 1992, to 20 in 1993 and finally to 25 percent in 1994. 
36 To be precise, Finnish house loans are not assumable mortgages but personal loans that are not tied to a 
particular dwelling. However, most Finnish house loans are secured by a home. 
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Limit (€) one 
childd
Limit (€) two or 
more children
1990 Progressive (49.7)a 85 3 360 3 700 590 1 180
1991 Progressive (48.9)a 80 3 360 4 040 590 1 180
1992 Progressive (51.7)a 75 3 360 4 370 670 1 350
1993 Flat (25 %)b No limit 1 350 2 700 335 670
1994 Flat (25 %) No limit 1 350 2 700 335 670
1995 Flat (25 %) No limit 1 350 2 700 335 670
1996 Flat (28 %) No limit 1 350 2 700 335 670
1997 Flat (28 %) No limit 1 350 2 700 335 670
1998 Flat (28 %) No limit 1 350 2 700 335 670
1999 Flat (28 %) No limit 1 350 2 700 335 670
2000 Flat (29 %) No limit 1 350 2 700 335 670
aAverage deduction rate.
For first-time buyers the deduction rate is 30 % from 1993 onwards.b
dThe limits for singles and married couples are inceared by the amounts in the last two colums.

















The average deduction rate before the reform equals the marginal income tax rate which 
consists of a flat municipal income tax and a progressive state income tax. From Table 1 we 
see that the average deduction rate was almost halved because of the tax reform. Therefore, 
also the tax subsidy resulting from the deduction was halved. Before the reform there was a 
limit on the percentage of interest expenses eligible for deduction. This limit was removed in 
1993. Furthermore, the amount of deductible interest expenses was limited before the reform. 
After the reform, the amount is limited only in a case where interest expenses exceed capital 
income, i.e. the size of the tax credit is limited not the amount of interest eligible for 
deduction. If the tax credit limit becomes binding a taxpayer can offset the resulting loss from 
her capital income accrued in the next ten years. However, the loss does not make the 
taxpayer eligible for another tax credit in future years.  
 
Because the significant reduction in the deduction rate Finnish authorities legislated a 
transition period for high-income households, who had taken a mortgage before the reform, so 
that they could deduct more mortgage interests than others. Thus, for high-income households 
with a mortgage taken before the reform the incentives to shuffle current portfolios were 
reduced somewhat. The transition period ended in 1999 and the amount of the transitional 
subsidy was significantly reduced during the latter part of the 1990’s. The enactment of the 
transitional subsidy highlights the fact that the tax reform substantially reduced the subsidy to 
 high-income households. Also the fact that first-time buyers can deduct interests at a higher 
rate may cause some problems in the econometric analysis, but the rate difference was 
reduced in the late 1990’s.  
 
3   Empirical strategy 
 
Studying the effects of taxation on household behaviour is difficult for a number of reasons. 37 
First, a fundamental problem of identification arises when using cross-section data when the 
marginal tax rate is a function of taxable income, which results in high collinearity between 
the two explanatory variables. Second, when the marginal tax rate is the same for all 
households, tax incentive effects cannot be identified from a single cross-section. Third, in a 
case where mortgage interest is deductible from taxable income of the taxpayer, marginal tax 
rate becomes an endogenous variable, i.e. the amount of mortgage debt a taxpayer chooses 
affects her marginal tax rate, and correspondingly, the marginal tax rate lowers the price of 
mortgage debt. Finally, especially in household investment considerations it may be that in 
fact future marginal tax rates are of importance in the household’s decision. However, in the 
case of mortgage debt interest payments are highest at the start of repayment, and thus, future 
tax considerations should not play such an important role here as opposed to long-term 
investment decisions where the gains are realised and taxed in the future. 
 
Our identification strategy is based on the fact that the 1993 tax reform was an exogenous 
event from the households’ point of view and affected the cost of borrowing of different 
household groups in different ways. Thus, the reform resembles a natural experiment and 
repeated cross-section data from before and after the reform enable the use of the difference-
in-differences technique. We follow Jappelli and Pistaferri (2006) who studied a similar 
reform in Italy and divide our sample into a control group and three treatment groups 
according to how the 1993 tax reform affected the cost of borrowing for these groups. Ideally, 
one would like to distinguish a control group that was clearly unaffected by the reform. 
However, this is impossible in this case and a control group can be defined only in 
approximate terms. The grouping was done in the following way. First, we imputed a 
marginal tax rate for each household, which depicts the interest deduction rate in the case 
                                                 
37 See e.g. Poterba (2001). 
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 where no tax reform was implemented. Basically we just added the local proportional tax rate 
(municipal and church tax) to the marginal state income tax rate of each household’s head. 
The marginal income tax rates were calculated using labour income only and before mortgage 
interest is deducted. Since the Finnish income taxation is based on individuals, it was optimal 
for the household to deduct interest expenses from the income of the highest earner in the 
family in order to maximise the benefit from the deduction. We simply refer to this variable 
as the marginal income tax rate of the household. Based on this variable, we divide 
households into four groups. Households whose marginal income tax rate is between 22 and 
28 percent serve as the control group. Remember that the deduction rate was set at 25 percent 
in 1993 and then increased slightly in the late 1990s. The first treatment group includes 
households with a marginal income tax rate below 22 percent (referred to as low group from 
now on). The second treatment group includes households with a marginal income tax rate 
between 29 and 40 percent (referred to as high1 group from now on). Finally, the third 
treatment group includes households with a marginal income tax rate above 40 percent 
(referred to as high2 group from now on). 
 
We are interested in both the propensity and the amount to borrow. To illustrate the 
difference-in-differences technique, consider first a probit model for the propensity to borrow 
with one treatment and control group: 
 
(1) ( ) ( )1 1 2 121| , , ,i i i i i i i i iP y G T G T G Tδ δ δ ′= = Φ + + × +x x β  
 
where y1 indicates that a household has a mortgage, ( ).Φ  is the cdf of the standard normal 
distribution, G = 1 if the household is in the treatment group and zero otherwise, T = 1 if the 
household is observed after the reform and zero otherwise, and the vector x includes 
household characteristics that control for observable group differences and an intercept. In a 
linear model with a similar structure, 12δ  would be the so-called difference-in-differences 
estimator that identifies the average treatment effect on the treated.38 However, as was shown 
by Puhani (2008) in the case of a probit model (or any model with a strictly monotonic link 
function) the average treatment effect on the treated is 
 
                                                 
38 See Wooldridge (2002), p. 130. 
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 (2) ( ) ( )1 2 12 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ,ATET δ δ δ δ δ⎡ ⎤′ ′= Φ + + + −Φ + +⎣ ⎦x β x β  
 
where the control variables in x are set at their sample means. The standard error for the 
treatment effect can be calculated using the delta method.39
 
The biggest drawback of the data sets used in this paper is that they do not include 
information on the households’ outstanding mortgage debt before 1993. They do, however, 
include information on annual tax deductible mortgage interest payments for the entire period. 
This information is used here to study whether the 1993 tax reform affected the amount that 
households borrow.40 The analysis is carried out in a standard tobit setting. The tobit model 
can be formulated in terms of a latent index as 
 
(3)   
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where  is the latent variable and y2iy
∗
2 is its observed counterpart which in this case is the 
observed amount of mortgage interest payments during a particular year, and ( )2~ 0,i Nε σ  
Our interest is in the observed y2. For brevity, let x2 denote all the variables on the right-hand-
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where ( ).φ  is the pdf of the standard normal distribution. Again following Puhani (2008) the 
treatment effect on the treated can be calculated the same way as in (2), i.e. 
                                                 
39 In this paper, this is done using the WALD command in LIMDEP 8.0. See Greene (2002) for details. 
40An overwhelming majority of Finnish households’ mortgages are adjustable rate mortgages. For example, in 
2001 94 percent of new mortgages in Finland had adjustable rates (Stephens, 2002). In most contracts the 
interest rate is adjusted every twelve months. For households who have moved within the survey years, interest 
payments will not give an accurate picture of the amount of mortgage debt they hold.  
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where  The treatment effect takes into account both the probability of taking 
a mortgage and the amount borrowed. The effect of the reform on these two margins cannot 
be identified separately.
( ) ( ) ( ). . /λ φ= Φ . .
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Because imputing marginal income tax rates is bound to produce some errors and the division 
of households into control and treatment groups is somewhat arbitrary in the above 
framework we also use an alternative identification strategy. The second strategy is based on 
the notion that under a progressive tax and deduction schedule taxable income affects 
mortgage demand in two ways.43 First, because housing is a normal good an increase in 
income should lead to an increase in housing demand and consequently in mortgage 
demand.44 Second, under a progressive tax schedule an increase in income leads to a higher 
marginal tax rate and effectively lowers the after-tax price of mortgage debt. Consequently, 
higher income leads to higher mortgage demand due to this price effect as well. From a cross-
section analysis it is very difficult to identify these effects. However, after the tax reform the 
after-tax price of mortgage debt is the same for all taxpayers regardless of their income. 
Therefore, with cross-section data from both before and after the reform the impact of the tax-
price effect can be identified. This strategy should not be so sensitive to possible errors in 
imputing marginal tax rates or to misallocation of households into control and treatment 
groups. Again income of household’s head before mortgage deductions is used in the 
estimation because it captures the tax price effect that a household faced before the reform.  
 
 
42 See Angrist (2001). 
43 See also Fjærli (2004). 
44 In fact, this assumption may not be valid. It is not clear whether income should have an isolated effect on 
mortgage demand. This assumption, however, is not necessary for our approach. 
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 In the alternative strategy, we test whether income has a different effect on the propensity to 
borrow and on the amount of interest payments before and after the reform. For example, in 
the probit model we are interest in the difference45  
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Under the null hypothesis of no reform effect the interaction effect should be is zero. Again 
the standard errors for the interaction effects can be calculated using the delta method. 
 
The validity of the above techniques depends on a number of assumptions. First, the tax 
reform must be exogenous with respect to the decision to borrow. Second, the reform must be 
exogenous with respect to changes in the sample composition. Third, there should not be any 
group-specific trends in the propensity to borrow. And finally, there should not be any 
simultaneous credit supply shifts correlated with the variables used for identification. We 
consider these assumptions after we present the results.  
 
4   Empirical results 
4.1 Data and variable description 
 
The datasets used in this study are the 1990–2000 household surveys from the Income 
Distribution Survey (IDS) produced by Statistics Finland. The IDS includes information on 
various household characteristics such as socio-economic status, demographics, income, 
taxes, and housing. Most of the information is collected from administrative registers and 
some of the information is collected through interviews. The IDS is a stratified sample drawn 
from all private households in Finland where the strata are created according to socio-
economic status and income. In order to minimise data collection costs and non-response, 
Statistics Finland assigns a higher inclusion probability to entrepreneurs and high-income 
households. The selected households are weighted in order to make the sample representative 
of the whole population. Each household is included in the sample for two consecutive years 
                                                 
45 This interaction effect does not coincide with the coefficient of the interaction term in a probit or any nonlinear 
model. See Ai and Norton (2003). 
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 so that every year half of the total sample is based on a new panel. Thus, the whole sample is 
renewed every other year. Because the techniques used in this paper require independent 
random samples we omit every other year from the analysis as a precaution. After this we are 
left with two years before (1990 and 1992) and four years after the reform (1994, 1996, 1998 
and 2000).  
 
As already mentioned, the main drawback of the data is that it does not include information 
on the outstanding mortgage debt before 1993. It does, however, include information on the 
tax deductible mortgage interest payments for the entire period. This, of course, does not 
provide accurate mortgage positions for the households but it is the best we can do with the 
data at hand. A problem arises in those cases where a household has taken a mortgage during 
the survey year. In these cases, interest payments underestimate the amount of outstanding 
mortgage debt. Unfortunately, we are unable to identify these households from the data. 
Furthermore, a potential problem arises if different household groups have different types of 
mortgage contracts. For example, if the households in the control group have mostly fixed 
rate mortgages compared to treatment groups where adjustable rate mortgage are more 
common, interest expenses would not correctly describe the evolution of mortgage amounts 
through time among different groups and would be a problem for the difference-in-differences 
technique. However, since the majority of mortgages in Finland are adjustable rate mortgages 
this should not be a great source of concern but should be kept in mind when interpreting the 
tobit results. The measurement error is, of course, not an issue in the probit model. 
 
Some summary statistics from the 1990–2000 IDS samples are presented in Table 2. On 
average, households with a mortgage are younger, have larger families and houses, are more 
likely to be married and have higher incomes. The effect of the recession can also be seen 
from Table 2. Households’ disposable income does not rise to the level of 1990 until 1998. 








 Table 2. Descriptive statistics from the 1990–2000 IDS samples. 
Variable Mortgage No mortgage Mortgage No mortgage Mortgage No mortgage
Age 41.43 50.87 41.49 50.42 40.99 51.40
ousehold size 2.91 1.95 2.95 1.95 2.94 1.94
ercentage married 0.68 0.39 0.67 0.40 0.63 0.39
isposable income 32 960 21 561 31 003 20 942 30 589 20 708
Mortgage interest 2 810 0.00 3 075 0 2 238 0
rea 93.87 68.49 94.81 69.64 96.16 72.52
ations 4 552 6 893 3 818 6 599 3 024 5 940
Mortgage No mortgage Mortgage No mortgage Mortgage No mortgage
Age 42.45 50.60 43.51 51.15 43.47 51.51
ousehold size 2.98 1.91 2.86 1.87 2.85 1.88
ercentage married 0.66 0.39 0.64 0.38 0.64 0.37
isposable income 31 561 20 791 34 157 21 657 36 896 23 972
ortgage interest 1 734 0.00 1 414 0 1 619 0
Floor area 101.1 72.73 103.0 72.17 105.6 73.55
ations 3 228 6 121 3 603 5 742 3 870 6 553
1996 1998 2000
es: Author's calculations from the 1990–2000 IDS data sets. Statistics are calculated using sampling weights. Income 




























4.2.   Difference-in-differences results 
 
Before estimation, we eliminated households with disposable income below €10,000 from the 
final sample because they are most likely to be credit-constrained and not able to respond to 
the reform anyway. This leaves us with a final sample size of 55,088 households (19,709 
before and 35,379 after). Both homeowners and renters are included. Of these, 21,767 
households had tax deductible mortgage interest expenses. Table 3 reports the size of control 
and treatment groups before and after the reform. From Table 3 it is obvious, that for a clear 
majority of Finnish households the tax reform reduced the incentives to borrow through a 
mortgage. 
 
Table 3. Number of households in the control and treatment groups. 
Low Control High1 High2 All
Before
A
943 1 399 9 317 8 050 19 709
fter 1 837 2 091 19 731 11 720 35 379






 In Table 4, we present difference-in-differences results using a probit model for the 
propensity to borrow. In the first model, only group and time dummies and interaction terms 
are included. The second model includes various household characteristics that should control 
for systematic differences between the control and treatment groups. The control variables 
include age, sex and education level of household head, a dummy variable indicating a 
married couple, number of children in the household, the urbanisation rate of the municipality  
the household resides in (urban, semi-urban and rural), and floor area and house type of the 
household’s residence. We report marginal effects for the dummy variables and the treatment 
effects presented in equation (2).  
 
The results in Table 4 show that the groups clearly differ in propensity to borrow before the 
reform as expected. The households in the low group were less likely to borrow than the 
control group and both high groups were more likely to borrow than the control group. The 
signs of the treatment effects are as expected. However, the effect is statistically significant 
only for the high2 group for which the imputed marginal tax rates are above 40 percent. The 
results are virtually identical after we control for observable household characteristics, except 
now the before reform group differences are smaller.  
 









low -0.073** 0.025 -0.093** 0.025
gh1 0.250** 0.016 0.133** 0.017
gh2 0.477** 0.014 0.281** 0.018
ter the reform 0.036 0.020 0.007 0.021
treatment for low 0.024 0.017 0.007 0.023
ent for high1 -0.024 0.021 -0.010 0.022
ent for high2 -0.110** 0.021 -0.100** 0.024
ontrol variables no yes
55 088 (21 767) 55 088 (21 767)








N (y = 1)
ps 2 0.07 0.21
es: Pre-reform years are 1990 and 1992 and the post-reform years are 1994–2000.The control 
ables include age, sex and education level of household head, a dummy indicating a married couple, 
ber of children in the household, urbanisation rate of household's municipality, floor area and building 
ype of household's residence. Marginal and treatment effects are evaluated at sample means of the 
ontrol variables. Standard erros for the treatment effects are calculated using the delta method. ** and * 





















 Table 5 presents the results for the amount of interest payments from a tobit model. The 
results are very similar to the probit models. However, now the negative treatment effect for 
high1 group is also statistically significant. After controlling for observable household 
characteristics, the treatment effects are smaller as are the pre-reform group differences. The 
results in Tables 4 and 5 clearly indicate that high income households with high marginal tax 
rates have responded to the reduced tax incentives by clearly reducing their mortgage 
borrowing.  
 









low -61.89* 26.99 -124.4** 42.51
gh1 612.4** 24.23 388.9** 33.55
high2 1636** 31.03 949.3** 37.04
ter the reform 32.93 19.52 -24.99 37.73
ent for low 29.03 34.15 -14.82 43.64
ent for high1 -240.0** 70.84 -165.0** 62.79
ent for high2 -822.4** 114.9 -555.6** 89.93
control variables no yes
55 088 (21 767) 55 088 (21 767)
og-L -225 602 -221 017
Notes: Pre-reform years are 1990 and 1992 and the post-reform years are 1994–2000.The control 
ables include age, sex and education level of household head, a dummy indicating a married couple, 
number of children in the household, urbanisation rate of household's municipality, floor area and building 
ype of household's residence. Marginal and treatment effects are evaluated at sample means of the 
control variables. Standard erros for the treatment effects are calculated using the delta method. ** and * 
























In Table 6 we report the results from our alternative identification strategy. In Table 6, 
income is in log form because for some reason the probit models failed to converge when 
level variables were used. In the tobit models also the dependent variable is in log form. The 
results show that after the reform income has clearly a smaller effect on both the propensity to 
borrow and the overall amount to borrow than before the reform. In fact, it seems that about 
half of the total positive income effect before the tax reform was due to the tax price effect. 
These results offer support for the results obtained using the difference-in-differences 
approach. Overall the reduction in mortgage interest payments due to the reform is substantial 
if one compares the results to the average payments reported in Table 2. This is somewhat 
surprising given the transitional subsidy scheme aimed toward high-income households.  
 
 54
 Table 6. Results for the alternative identification strategy.  








og of income 0.284** 0.006 0.189** 0.007
after the reform 0.767** 0.025 0.684** 0.033
nteraction effect of
og of income and time -0.122** 0.007 -0.101** 0.007
ontrol variables no yes
55 088 (21 767) 55 088 (21 767)






N (y = 1)
l
ps 2 0.07 0.20








og of income 2.213** 0.045 1.291** 0.044
after the reform 4.050** 0.364 2.653** 0.303
nteraction effect of
og of income and time -0.999** 0.052 -0.705** 0.045
ontrol variables no yes
55 088 (21 767) 55 088 (21 767)
log-L -94 440 -89 861
es: Pre-reform years are 1990 and 1992 and the post-reform years are 1994–2000.The control 
ables include age, sex and education level of household head, a dummy indicating a married couple, 
ber of children in the household, urbanisation rate of household's municipality, floor area and building 
ype of household's residence. Marginal and treatment effects are evaluated at sample means of the 
ontrol variables. Standard erros for the treatment effects are calculated using the delta method. ** and * 





























The fact, that the dependant variable under scrutiny is limited to be non-negative poses some 
problems in interpreting the results. A tempting interpretation of our result would be that not 
only has the tax reform induced a lower propensity to take a mortgage for high-income 
households but also that those who do take a mortgage take smaller mortgages on average 
than before the reform. However, as is argued by Angrist (2001), in general, these so-called 
conditional on positive effects cannot be identified in this setting. The tobit results take into 
account both the probability of having a mortgage and the amount borrowed as can be seen 
from equation (4).  
 
A further concern with the econometrics is that the tobit model is inconsistent if normality or 
homoscedasticity assumptions of the error term are violated. One possible alternative would 
be to use some robust estimator like the censored least absolute deviations estimator (CLAD) 
proposed by Powell (1984). However, the CLAD model is defined in terms of the latent index 
and treatment effects cannot be calculated for the observed variable. The tobit estimation were 
repeated using a simple linear model with OLS and the results were very similar.  
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 4.3   Robustness checks and confounding factors 
 
We conducted some robustness checks to our analysis not reported here for brevity. First, we 
excluded the year 1992 and compared 1990 to post-reform years. The results were virtually 
the same using both the difference-in-differences and the alternative identification strategy. 
Thus, it seems that households did not react to any announcement of the coming tax reform in 
1992.46 Then we started to exclude post-reform years closest to the reform one by one, i.e. 
compared 1990 to 1996–2000 period, 1990 to 1998–2000 period and so on. Again the results 
were very similar using both strategies. We also lowered the income threshold first to €5,000 
euros and also used the entire sample. Again the results were the same when we repeated the 
steps discussed above. This is to be expected because the income threshold mostly affects the 
low group which was non-responsive anyway. Furthermore, the results were robust to 
exclusion of the highest five percent of the income distribution.  
 
Finally, we have to consider whether the tax reform is the only plausible explanation for the 
results. First of all, there should be no reason to doubt the exogeneity of the tax reform. 
Perhaps the most severe confounding factor would be a shift in credit supply that is somehow 
correlated with household income. The Finnish mortgage stock has grown considerably since 
the late 1990’s due to economic recovery, low interest rates and longer annuities in the new 
loans. This has meant that low- and middle-income households have probably had the 
opportunity to take larger mortgages than before. This could confound the results found in 
Tables 3 to 5. However, we also repeated the analysis by excluding1998 and 2000. Again the 
results were unchanged. This gives support for the tax reform story because new larger 
mortgages became available only in the late 1990s. 
 
Another major confounding factor in the early 1990’s was, of course, the recession. Since the 
banks experienced major credit losses during that time, the expected reaction from this would 
be that high-income households would be in a better position to obtain a mortgage relative to 
lower income households, and thus, we should find a stronger positive income effect after the 
recession. Furthermore, due to the recession unemployment risk probably rose more for low-
                                                 
46 The exact time of the announcement of a coming tax reform is unclear. The government bill for the income tax 
was dated on the 25th of September 1992. However, some information about the nature of the reform must have 
surfaced even earlier.  
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 income households relative to high-income households which may have an adverse effect on 
mortgage demand of low-income households. However, the effect we find is exactly the 
opposite. If the recession had the described effects our results are probably underestimates of 
the true effects. Furthermore, rent controls were phased out in 1992–1995 which again should 
affect the tenure choice of households. However, it is difficult to know which types of 
households were on the margin that may switch or may have switched tenure due rent control 
relaxes. Furthermore, homeownership is still clearly tax favoured after the tax reform because 
imputed rental income and capital gains are untaxed. This means that the tax reform did not 
induce incentives for high-income households to make different tenure choices than before.  
 
5   Conclusions 
 
The 1993 Finnish tax reform reduced the incentives to use mortgage financing in home 
acquisition for high-income households. Before the reform mortgage interest was deductible 
according to a progressive schedule creating a so-called upside-down effect, which means that 
the benefit from the deduction was the greater the higher was the taxpayer’s income and 
marginal income tax rate. After the reform, the deduction is made according to a flat schedule, 
and thus, the benefit no longer depends on taxpayer’s marginal income tax rate.  
 
This paper used household level repeated cross-section data from before and after the reform 
to study whether Finnish households have responded to these changed incentives. One can 
distinguish three groups of taxpayers that were differently affected by the reform. First, for 
low-income taxpayers, i.e. those in lower tax brackets, the subsidy resulting from mortgage 
interest deduction was slightly increased. Thus, for low-income taxpayers the incentive to 
borrow was also increased. Second, taxpayers in the middle tax brackets were (virtually) 
unaffected by the reform. And finally, for high-income taxpayers the subsidy was reduced and 
so was their incentive to borrow. This setting can be seen as a natural experiment, where one 
can distinguish multiple treatment groups and a control group. The treatment groups include 
households, who were affected by the reform and the control group are those, who were 
unaffected. This grouping is the basis of the analysis in this paper and enables the use of the 
so-called difference-in-difference technique. 
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 Our results, based on the difference-in-differences approach, show that high income 
households with high marginal tax rates have responded to the reduced tax incentives by 
clearly reducing their mortgage borrowing compared to the control group. The results remain 
robust after controlling for observable household characteristics and to several sensitivity tests 
based on sub-samples of the data. Furthermore, since the construction of the control and 
treatment groups was somewhat arbitrary we used an alternative identification strategy which 
does not suffer from this problem. This alternative strategy also lent strong support for the 
difference-in-differences results. However, some caution should be taken when interpreting 
the results because the reform coincided with turbulent times in the Finnish economy and 
obviously all confounding factors cannot be ruled out.  
 
The results of this paper are in line with previous results from other countries, except Jappelli 
and Pistaferri’s (2006) analysis of Italian households, and should be useful when various tax 
incentive plans are proposed or considered. Furthermore, the elimination of mortgage interest 
deduction is often suggested in public debate. Our results indicate that the elimination would 
result in a reduction in mortgage demand. Hendershott et al. (2003) and Hendershott and 
White (2006) show that this indeed happened in the U.K. when mortgage interest 
deductibility (so-called MIRAS scheme) was phased out. The decline in mortgage demand 
would have implications for both financial and housing markets. The elimination of mortgage 
interest deduction would not, however, eliminate the fundamental tax advantage to owner-
occupied housing, which is the non-taxation of imputed rental income and capital gains. Thus, 
the effect on the demand for owner-occupied housing remains ambiguous because households 
can mitigate the rise in the user-cost resulting from the elimination by substituting mortgage 
debt with own equity. The elimination might postpone households’ transition to 
homeownership or even household formation, and result in riskier household portfolios if 
households substitute debt with equity financing. These questions should prove as fruitful 
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This paper studies the linkage between owner-occupied housing and portfolio choice. Using a 
theoretical simulation model with Finnish asset return data we find that a leveraged position 
in housing has a clear negative effect on the share of stocks in a mean-variance efficient 
portfolio. The second part of the paper studies how owner-occupied housing actually affects 
households’ financial portfolios using Finnish household data. The main result indicates that 
the more valuable house a homeowner resides in, at a given level of net wealth, the less likely 
it is to own stocks. However, it seems that housing has only a small effect if any on the share 
of financial assets a household invests in stocks conditional on stockholding.  
 
 
Keywords: portfolio choice, owner-occupied housing 













 1.   Introduction 
 
Housing services are a necessity and a major component of household consumption 
expenditures. For example, Englund et al. (2002) report that a household living in Western 
Europe or in North America spends on average 25 to 35 percent of its income on housing. In 
addition to a consumption motive, households must consider investment aspects when 
choosing their housing tenure mode, the quantity of housing services to consume, and the size 
of mortgage debt. In fact, housing is by far the largest individual component of households’ 
wealth. Statistics Finland report that in 1998 housing constituted 66 percent of Finnish 
households’ overall gross wealth. Further calculations from household level data (the 1998 
Wealth Survey of Statistics Finland) reveal that it is common for a young Finnish homeowner 
to invest two to three times its entire net wealth into housing using mortgage financing, and 
even for middle-aged homeowners a house constitutes on average almost 100 percent of their 
net wealth. At the same time, only about 15 percent of Finnish households had stockholdings 
and the average share of financial wealth invested in stocks was only about 25 percent. 
 
A natural question that arises in light of these figures is whether such a high portfolio share of 
housing is optimal from portfolio diversification point of view, or whether it’s driven by 
institutional constraints that prevent households from separately choosing the level of housing 
consumption and investment. Theoretical literature on this issue began with Henderson and 
Ioannides (1983) who introduced a model where a housing consumption motive introduces a 
lower bound for housing investment for homeowners. This simply means that a homeowner 
cannot own only a fraction of the house it resides in. If a homeowner’s housing consumption 
demand is equal or larger than investment demand, consumption and investment decisions are 
no longer separable. Brueckner (1997) connects the Henderson and Ioannides model into a 
mean-variance portfolio decision framework. He shows that when consumption demand for 
housing is equal or larger than investment demand, homeowners’ investment portfolios are no 
longer necessarily efficient in a mean-variance sense. Homeowners could attain a larger 
expected return on their portfolios without increasing its variance by adjusting their housing 
investment. They are prevented from doing so, however, because their housing investment is 
constrained by consumption demand. That is, homeowners tolerate inefficiency in their 
portfolios because adjusting the level of housing investment would create utility losses by 
lowering the amount of housing services consumed.  
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Flavin and Yamashita (2002) quantify these effects using numerical simulation. They show 
using historical asset return data in the U.S. that house value-to-net wealth ratio has a 
dramatic effect on the share of risky financial assets in a household’s mean-variance efficient 
portfolio. This is because a leveraged position in a volatile asset such as housing exposes 
households to a background risk that has an adverse effect on their desire to take additional 
risks in their financial portfolios.47  
 
The above argumentation suggests that any empirical analysis of households’ financial 
portfolio choices should take housing directly into account. This is particularly true in Finland 
where the promotion of homeownership has been and still is a central part of housing policy. 
Mainly this is manifested as lenient tax treatment of owner-occupied housing relative to rental 
housing. In Finland, imputed rental income and capital gains from owner-occupied housing 
are untaxed and mortgage interest is tax deductible. On the other hand, rental income and 
capital gains received by landlords are fully taxed. Because of these provisions in the tax code 
the return to homeownership is higher; however, the non-taxation of capital gains also makes 
the investment riskier because capital losses are not deductible. In addition to a general tax 
subsidy to all homeowners, the Finnish government promotes homeownership through a 
partial government guarantee of mortgage loans from private financial institutions and an 
interest subsidy scheme targeted at low and middle-income households. Not only do these 
schemes make homeownership the cheapest way to acquire housing services for a majority of 
Finnish households, but they also encourage young, relatively low-wealth households to hold 
portfolios consisting mainly of leveraged housing capital. Thus, housing consumption demand 
in the spirit of Henderson and Ioannides (1983) and Bruekcner (1997) may be a major factor 
driving the financial portfolio choices of Finnish households.  
 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we employ a simulation approach similar to Flavin 
and Yamashita (2002) to study how investing in owner-occupied housing affects a 
homeowner’s optimal portfolio choice under current investment environment in Finland. The 
main contribution, though, is to study how homeownership actually affects households’ 
                                                 
47 Yamashita (2003) and Yao and Zhang (2005) present microeconometric evidence which shows that investing 
in owner-occupied housing has a negative effect on the stockholdings of U.S. households.   
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 stockholding behaviour using micro data of Finnish households. This paper is also the first 
rigorous empirical analysis of the determinants of Finnish household portfolios.  
 
The findings of this study can be summarised as follows. Simulation results show that in the 
light of historical asset returns a leveraged position in housing has a clear negative effect on 
the share of stocks in a mean-variance efficient portfolio. This effect is amplified for more 
risk-averse households. Econometric results reveal that housing investment has an adverse 
effect on Finnish households’ probability to hold stocks. This result can be interpreted in two 
ways. First, at a given level of net wealth higher house value exposes households to higher 
house price risk possibly inducing them to mitigate their stockholding. On the other hand, 
higher house value at a given level of net wealth and mortgage debt automatically means a 
lower level of financial wealth for the household. So the result may also indicate that some 
households do not enter the stock market simply because they do not have funds to invest 
because almost their entire wealth consists of housing. Although, the results hinted that the 
latter effect is more important, the relative importance of these two effects cannot be deduced 
explicitly from the data. The results concerning the amount invested in stocks conditional on 
participating are inconclusive. However, it seems that housing has only a small effect if any 
on the share of financial assets invested in stocks.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the simulation results based 
on the model by Flavin and Yamashita (2002) where owner-occupied housing is introduced 
into a mean-variance portfolio framework. In section 3, econometric results using household 
level data are presented. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.   Housing in a mean-variance portfolio framework 
2.1. Theoretical model 
 
In this section, we use the model introduced by Flavin and Yamashita (2002) to study how 
owner-occupied housing affects household portfolio choice. The model can be used to 
simulate what the optimal portfolio shares should be in theory for a homeowner household 
with a leveraged position in housing using data on historical asset returns. In the model, 
owner-occupied housing and mortgage debt are introduced as part of a homeowner’s portfolio 
problem in an otherwise traditional mean-variance framework. The model abstracts from the 
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 tenure choice problem by assuming that homeownership is the preferred tenure due to e.g. tax 
distortions and agency costs related to renting. A homeowner’s total net wealth at time t is  
 
(1)      ,t t tW P′= +X I tH
 
where Xt is a (1 x n) vector of amounts held in i = 1,…, n risky assets, I is vector of ones, Ht 
the quantity of housing and Pt the unit price of housing. The last element in Xt represents 
mortgage holdings. The constraints on financial asset holdings are 
 
(2)      , 0,t t n tPH X− ≤ ≤
(3)      , 0,     1,..., 1.i tX i n≥ = −
 
Constraint in (2), the mortgage constraint, states that the household can borrow only up to 
house value and cannot be a mortgage lender. Constraint (3) requires non-negative financial 
asset holdings. Thus, the household can only borrow through a mortgage debt. The asset 
returns are random and are decomposed into the expected return and a stochastic component 
as follows: , ,i t i i tR µ ε= +  and , , ,H t H HR tµ ε= +  with ,i t iE R µ⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦  and , .H tE R Hµ⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ The 
covariance matrix of the returns is given by [ ],t tE ′=Ω ε ε  where ( )1, , ,,..., , .t t n t H tε ε ε ′≡ε  The 
vector of expected returns on financial assets is defined as  Now the 
household’s optimisation problem can be expressed in terms of choosing asset shares x
( 1,..., .n ′≡µ µ µ )
t: 
 
(4) ( ) [ ] [ ]max , ,
2t t t H t t t t





s.t.  1 ,
     0,












where  The idea is that the household maximises expected 
utility of wealth with respect to holdings of financial assets conditional on the current value of 
/    and   / .t t t t t t th PH W W≡ x X
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 ht, which we refer to as the housing constraint.48 The motivation for this is that once a 
homeowner household commits itself to a particular level of housing consumption, the 
optimal adjustment interval may be very long because of adjustment costs. Arguably, the 
costs of adjusting the quantities of financial assets are smaller. The household’s risk 
preferences are represented by the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion, A.  
 
2.2   Optimal portfolios with Finnish asset return data 
 
Following Flavin and Yamashita (2002) we estimate ,tµ Hµ  and  using historical data on 
Finnish asset and housing returns and solve the optimisation problem in (4) for different 
values of the housing constraint and the risk aversion parameter. We use quarterly asset return 
data on five broad asset classes from 1995 to 2005. Eleven years is a rather short period, 
especially when considering homebuyers investment horizons. However, major institutional 
reforms took place during the early 1990’s. Most notably, a major reform on capital income 
taxation was implemented in 1993, rent controls were phased out on private rental dwellings 
during 1992–1995, and Finland joined the EU in 1995 and EMU in 1999. The last mentioned 
have meant a period of low inflation and nominal interest rates. Furthermore, from 1993 
onwards foreign investors have been allowed to freely invest in Finnish securities.
Ω
49 Using 
data from before 1995 would not give a true picture of the current investment opportunities 
available to households and the linkages between different asset returns. 
 
Table 1 reports mean quarterly asset returns, standard deviations, and the correlation matrix 
for the asset returns. Details of the calculations can be found in the appendix. The real after-
tax quarterly returns from different assets range from 0.21 percent from bank accounts to 2.15 
percent from owner-occupied housing. Housing has been a very profitable investment in 
Finland during the period. Houses have even outperformed stocks: they offered a slightly 
higher return and a lower standard deviation. However, this is mostly due to the fact that 
Finnish house prices busted in the early 1990’s and have increased rapidly since. Moreover, 
the risk of the housing investment a homeowner faces is probably underestimated in these 
                                                 
48 This formulation of the objective function is based on the assumptions that the utility function is of the 
constant relative aversion (CRRA) form and asset returns are normally distributed. See Flavin and Yamashita 
(1998) or Blake (1996) for details.  
49 Oikarinen (2006) finds evidence of a structural break in the long-run relationship between stock and house 
prices in Finland at beginning of 1993. He concludes that this was probably due to the abolition of foreign 
ownership restrictions in the stock market. 
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 calculations because we use a nationwide house price index which ignores the idiosyncratic or 
house specific part of the risk.50 Of course, using a stock index as a measure of risk and return 
of stock investments probably underestimates the risks involved in stock investment of a 
typical stockowner household who owns individual stocks instead of an index or other mutual 
funds.  
 
Housing returns are negatively correlated with other assets except for stocks. Compared to 
other countries, housing has offered high returns in Finland.51 Finnish asset returns are most 
comparable to the ones found by Iacoviello and Ortalo-Magné (2003) with U.K. data except 
that in Finland housing and bond returns have a negative correlation as opposed to a positive 
one in the U.K. This may be because our data on bond returns include short maturities, which 
are found to have a negative correlation with housing returns in the U.K. Flavin and 
Yamashita (2002) find negative but insignificantly small correlations between housing and all 
financial asset returns in the U.S.  
 
Bank account Bonds Stocks Mortgage House
Return 0.0021 0.0106 0.0207 0.0083 0.0215
d. 0.0016 0.0151 0.0860 0.0030 0.0190
rrelation matrix
Bank account Bonds Stocks Mortgage House
Bank account 1.0000
onds 0.7263 1.0000
tocks 0.0338 -0.1954 1.0000
ortgage 0.8528 0.6420 -0.0214 1.0000
















Table 2 reports the simulated optimal portfolios for different levels of the housing constraint 
and risk aversion using the returns and the correlation matrix reported in Table 1. The values 
of the housing constraint correspond to age group averages in the parentheses calculated from 
the 1998 Wealth Survey of Statistics Finland. Table 2 is constructed so that the financial asset 
shares sum up to one and the value of -1 for mortgage means that the house is fully 
mortgaged. With low levels of risk aversion (A = 1) the optimal portfolio consist of only 
                                                 
50 See Englund et al. (2002) and the appendix for details. In fact, Englund et al. (2002) report that the house 
specific risk alone is much larger than the risk measured by a general house price index. The difference is 
smaller with longer investment horizons.  
51 See Iacoviello and Ortalo-Magné (2003) for further discussion on country differences. 
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 stocks, regardless of the housing constraint. However, with higher levels of risk aversion the 
share of stocks declines as the household replaces stocks with bonds. Interestingly, even at 
very high levels of risk aversion bank accounts are not included in the optimal portfolio.52 
This is true even when the housing constraint is introduced. The most interesting prediction 
from the simulation model concerning our econometric models is that with moderate and high 
levels of risk aversion (  the optimal share of stocks depends negatively on the housing 
constraint. That is, the higher the housing constraint the lower is the optimal share of stocks in 
the financial portfolio. At very high levels of risk aversion and housing constraint it is optimal 
for a homeowner not to hold stocks. The results are similar to the ones obtained by Flavin and 
Yamashita (2002).  
2)A ≥
House value-to-net 
wealth ratio Assets Degree of risk aversion
A = 1 A = 2 A = 4 A = 8 A = 10
 = 2.295 Bank account 0 0 0 0 0
Bonds 0 0.5088 0.8217 0.9782 1
Stocks 1 0.4912 0.1783 0.0218 0
Mortgage -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
 = 1.516 Bank account 0 0 0 0 0
Bonds 0 0.4432 0.7561 0.9126 0.9439
Stocks 1 0.5568 0.2439 0.0874 0.0561
Mortgage -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
h  = 1.016 Bank account 0 0 0 0 0
Bonds 0 0.4011 0.7140 0.8705 0.9018
Stocks 1 0.5989 0.2860 0.1295 0.0982
Mortgage -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
 = 0.871 Bank account 0 0 0 0 0
Bonds 0 0.3889 0.7018 0.8583 0.8896
Stocks 1 0.6111 0.2982 0.1417 0.1104
Mortgage -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
 = 0.716 Bank account 0 0 0 0 0
Bonds 0 0.3758 0.6888 0.8453 0.8766
Stocks 1 0.6242 0.3112 0.1547 0.1234
Mortgage -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
 = 0.789 Bank account 0 0 0 0 0
(71 + ) Bonds 0 0.3820 0.6949 0.8514 0.8827
Stocks 1 0.6180 0.3051 0.1486 0.1173












                                                
 



















In Table 2 the decreasing pattern of stock investment is driven by the household’s desire to 
hedge against the increase in the risk of its portfolio induced by housing. If, however, there 
 
52 Of course in reality, money is kept in bank accounts due to liquidity and possibly buffer-stock considerations. 
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 are entry or participation costs to stock markets housing investment may, in effect, crowd-out 
investment in stocks. In other words, if the house takes a sufficiently large share of overall 
wealth, it may be optimal for the household not to participate in the stock market simply 
because the gain from doing so does not exceed the costs. Empirical evidence suggests that 
surprisingly small participation costs are sufficient to deter households from participating in 
the stock market.53 We will return to this in the econometric part. Furthermore, for 
homeowners who are expecting to move up the housing ladder in the future, it may optimal to 
accumulate housing wealth because it works as an insurance against house price risk. This is 
true especially if the household is expecting to move within the same housing market where 
house prices are highly correlated. This aspect is emphasised by Nordvik (2001) and Sinai 
and Souleles (2005).  
 
3.   Econometric analysis 
3.1   Data and descriptive analysis 
 
In the econometric analysis, we use data from the 1998 Wealth Survey of Statistics Finland. 
Along with portfolio information, the Wealth Survey includes information on various 
household characteristics such as socio-economic status, demographics, income, taxes, and 
housing. Part of the information in the survey is collected from various administrative 
registers. The amounts of various assets are collected through interviews. The sample is a 
stratified sample drawn from all private households in Finland where the strata are created 
according to socio-economic status and income. For practical reasons, entrepreneurs and 
high-income households are assigned a higher inclusion probability to the final sample which 
includes all in all 3893 households. The selected households are given sampling weights so 
that the sample can be made representative of the whole population. We start the empirical 
analysis by reporting some descriptive statistics. Table 3 presents the percentage of 
households owning particular assets and liabilities, and the asset shares of total wealth 
classified by household net wealth and age.  
 
 
                                                 
53Vissing-Jorgenson (2002) finds that a mere annual cost of 50 dollars (in 2000 prices) was enough to explain the 
nonparticipation of half of the nonparticipant households in the U.S. in 1994. 260 dollars was enough to explain 
the behavior of 75 percent of nonparticipants. This reflects the fact that nonparticipants had very little financial 
wealth to invest in the first place. 
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 Table 3. Asset ownership by net wealth quartiles and age in Finland, 1998. 
Net wealth quartile
All I II III IV top 5 %
Percentage holding the asset
L
M
isted stocks 14.9 2.6 9.8 11.5 35.7 56.6
utual funds 3.4 1.6 0.9 1.8 9.3 16.8
onds 2.6 0.6 1.1 1.4 7.0 12.1
Owner-occupied dwelling 63.7 4.4 56.0 95.2 99.3 98.6
ortgage 28.3 8.6 35.1 38.5 31.1 28.5
Percentage of total financial assets
isted stocks 19.5 2.4 8.1 5.0 24.2 33.9
utual funds 2.9 0.4 0.8 1.4 4.2 5.0
  Bonds 2.6 1.3 0.4 0.7 3.3 2.8
Percentage of total gross assets
ner-occupied dwelling 59.2 42.4 66.0 73.3 53.0 42.5
ortgage 10.0 82.3 31.0 11.9 4.2 2.6
Average holdings
Average total net wealth, € 86 865 1 292 28 062 83 059 239 473 501 749
verage stockholding, € 17 298 1 961 4 637 4 471 28 801 79 473
verage house value, € 92 166 45 540 52 004 73 964 134 395 223 112
verage mortgage, € 34 873 45 285 38 990 29 772 33 637 47 690
Age group
Under 25 25 - 34 35 - 44 45 - 54 55 - 64 Over 64
Percentage holding the asset
isted stocks 10.6 11.6 14.9 19.9 18.0 12.1
utual funds 2.4 3.6 3.0 4.1 4.2 2.9
onds 1.5 1.7 2.3 1.8 3.9 3.7
Owner-occupied dwelling 11.3 39.4 66.5 77.6 81.9 72.6
ortgage 10.7 36.2 49.3 37.5 19.3 5.2
Percentage of total financial assets
isted stocks 8.8 18.4 17.3 18.5 21.7 21.5
utual funds 3.1 1.0 3.6 2.6 6.9 1.8
onds 2.6 0.4 2.7 3.3 2.3 2.9
Percentage of total gross assets
ner-occupied dwelling 46.3 61.3 66.8 58.8 53.1 57.9
ortgage 25.5 28.1 20.0 7.6 3.2 0.6
Average holdings
verage total net wealth, € 15 363 51 260 90 387 123 419 141 556 104 261
verage stockholding, € 4 254 10 662 13 857 16 071 25 238 22 075
verage house value, € 68 876 88 834 102 982 96 333 91 734 81 428
verage mortgage, € 39 894 44 381 41 586 25 838 23 148 12 392
es: House refers to the households primary dwelling. Average holdings are 
alculated conditional on ownership. Sampling weigths are used in the calculations.






















































About 15 percent of Finnish households had direct stock investments in 1998. Households’ 
participation in the stock market (both directly and through mutual funds) clearly increases 
with household wealth level. The same is true for bond ownership indicating that wealthier 
households have more complete portfolios. Similar pattern is evident in the share of financial 
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 wealth invested in stocks. Furthermore, households in the top half of the wealth distribution 
are almost exclusively homeowners. Interestingly, wealthy households also hold significant 
amounts of mortgage debt. This seems to indicate that mortgage debt is used for portfolio 
balancing purposes. In other words, these households understand that paying down the 
mortgage may not be the ideal investment strategy, but instead it may be optimal to invest in 
stocks and enjoy arbitrage returns. This opportunity is enhanced by the deductibility of 
mortgage interest in taxation and is more attractive for wealthy households for whom a 
leveraged position in housing does not necessarily induce a highly risky financial position. 
 
Stock ownership follows a hump-shaped age pattern peaking after the age of 45 and dropping 
again after retirement. However, once a household owns stocks there is no clear age pattern in 
the share of financial wealth invested in stocks. Similar but stronger, age pattern is evident 
with homeownership which peaks a little later than stock ownership. The figures in Table 3 
also give some indication that the age pattern of housing and mortgage choices does not 
entirely coincide with the age pattern of stockholding in the way the simulation model 
predicts. Thus, either age has a direct effect on stockholding or age is correlated with 
something that is not accounted for in these simple calculations. 
 
In the econometric models, we concentrate on homeowners and discard the possible sample 
selection problems associated with dropping renter households from the sample. Since we are 
interested in portfolio choice, only households who have sufficient funds to form a reasonable 
portfolio are included in the analysis. We exclude households with financial wealth smaller 
than €1000. This eliminates 397 households. We also exclude households with negative 
overall net wealth and annual income smaller than €5000 which eliminates additional 54 
households. Furthermore, we eliminate outliers by excluding observations with a house value-
to-net wealth ratio greater than 20,54 a mortgage expenses to annual disposable income ratio 
greater than 1 and a negative net housing wealth. These exclusions eliminate 25 households. 
Finally, we exclude households where the household head was a student. There were only 6 
student households left after the initial trimming and none of them had stockholdings. This 
leaves us with a final sample size of 2437 homeowners. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics 
for key variables in various sub-samples that are used in the econometric models.  
                                                 
54 This figure corresponds to a 95 percent mortgage loan-to-house value ratio. Usually banks offering mortgages 
in Finland require that the loan-to-value ratio does not exceed 80 or 85 percent when the house is bought.   
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for key variables in different sub-samples of homeowners.  
All All, All, All, Stocks>0, Stocks>0,
mortgage>0 mortgage=0 Stocks>0 mortgage>0 mortgage=0
N 2 437 1 064 1 373 774 315 459
ercentage holding stocks 0.26 0.27 0.26 1.00 1.00 1.00
[0.005] [0.016] [0.014] . . .
Share of fin. wealth in stocks 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.33 0.32 0.34
[0.005] [0.007] [0.007] [0.014] [0.021] [0.019]
ncome / 10 000 2.84 3.42 2.46 3.33 3.74 3.04
[0.038] [0.056] [0.046] [0.080] [0.122] [0.100]
 wealth / 10 000 14.1 11.9 15.5 21.0 16.7 24.0
[0.310] [0.397] [0.444] [0.824] [1.076] [1.151]
53.0 43.1 59.6 51.1 43.4 56.5
[0.416] [0.425] [0.486] [0.702] [0.788] [0.851]
ber of adults 1.88 1.95 1.83 1.96 1.95 1.98
[0.019] [0.025] [0.027] [0.032] [0.043] [0.047]
number of children 0.58 1.05 0.27 0.59 0.95 0.34
[0.024] [0.045] [0.021] [0.039] [0.071] [0.037]
emale household head 0.36 0.30 0.40 0.29 0.25 0.31
[0.013] [0.019] [0.018] [0.023] [0.031] [0.031]
versity degree (%) 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.19 0.22 0.18
[0.007] [0.012] [0.008] [0.017] [0.026] [0.022]
e / 10 000 9.58 10.7 8.81 11.8 12.4 11.5
[0.164] [0.224] [0.225] [0.331] [0.485] [0.447]
ortgage / 10 000 1.36 3.39 . 1.36 3.31 .
[0.059] [0.102] . [0.101] [0.169] .
h 0.92 1.31 0.65 0.75 1.05 0.55
[0.020] [0.044] [0.008] [0.027] [0.058] [0.013]
0.25 0.63 . 0.18 0.44 .
[0.019] [0.043] . [0.025] [0.057] .
es: Mean values of key variables in different sub-samples. Stantdard errors are in the brackets. Sampling weights are 
ed in the calculations. Variables h and m refer to house value-to-net wealth and mortgage-to-net wealth ratios, respectively.




































3.2   Econometric models and endogeneity of key variables 
 
We follow the basic guidelines from previous econometric research on household portfolio 
choice and model both the participation decision and the share of financial assets held in 
stocks. The variable of interest in the numerical simulation model was house value-to-net 
wealth ratio. However, in the econometric models the levels of house value and mortgage 
debt are used as key explanatory variables because a major multicollinearity problem was 
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 found when these variables are divided by net wealth.55 This choice of variables should not 
have a major effect on the results since we are directly controlling for net wealth. The house 
value variable is estimated by the homeowner. This, of course, is a biased estimate of the true 
market value of the house. However, this variable is exactly what we are interested in because 
the portfolio choices of homeowners are based on their own evaluation of their situation, 
including the value of their house. 
 
There are reasons to be suspicious about the exogeneity of the key explanatory variables. For 
example, homeowners who have high valuations of what their house is worth may also hold 
more positive expectations on how well the stock market performs, and thus, are more willing 
to invest in stocks.56 Even more worrying is that the Wealth Survey data set does not include a 
proxy variable for risk aversion, which is the main driver of household stockholding under 
expected utility theory. Since these omitted variables may also be correlated with households’ 
housing choices, our key explanatory variables are possibly endogenous. Dealing with 
endogeneity in a binary choice model is somewhat difficult, especially when one of the 
possibly endogenous variables is a corner solution variable, which is the case here with 
mortgage debt. Roughly half of the homeowners in our sample are outright owners and have 
zero holdings of mortgage debt. Fortunately, there is a simple way to test exogeneity using a 
two-step procedure introduced by Rivers and Vuong (1988). 57 Consider a model 
 
(5)   ( )1 1i 1 2 3 11 0i i iy y yα δ ε′= + + + >z β ,i
2(6) 2 2 ,i i iy ε′= +z β    
(7) 3 3 ,i i iy 3ε′= +z β    
 
where y1 indicates stockholding and 1(.) is an indicator function taking the value 1 if the 
statement in the parenthesis is true and 0 otherwise. Equation (5) is the structural equation of 
interest and (6) and (7) are the reduced forms for house value and mortgage debt, denoted by 
y2 and y3, respectively. The vector z includes all exogenous variables including the ones in z1 
with some elements (the instruments) that are not included in z1. The error terms are assumed 
                                                 
55 The correlation coefficient for these variables in the sample of homeowners was 0.96. The correlation for the 
level variables was only 0.26. 
56 Dominitz and Manski (2007) find evidence that U.S. households have heterogeneous expectations on stock 
returns, and that households with more positive expectations also hold more stocks.  
57 See Wooldridge (2002) pp. 474–478 for further details. 
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 to be independent of z1 and z. However, if the error term in the structural equation is 
correlated with y2 and y3, the usual univariate probit estimation of (5) leads to inconsistent 
estimates. The Rivers-Voung test procedure involves two steps. First, estimate the reduced 
form models in (6) and (7) using OLS to obtain the residuals for each model. Second, add 
these residuals as additional right-hand side variables in (5) and estimate the model as a 
univariate probit using maximum likelihood. A joint test on the significance of the 
coefficients of the residuals is a test for exogeneity.58 The share of financial wealth invested in 
stocks or mutual funds is modelled using the sample selection framework. Using instrumental 
variables in a sample selection model is more straightforward because the second step can be 
estimated simply as a linear regression as proposed by Heckman (1979).  
 
In order to perform exogeneity tests, we need instruments that are correlated with house value 
and mortgage debt but are not correlated with the omitted variables in the error term in (5). As 
an instrument for house value, we use a quality adjusted regional house price index obtained 
from a hedonic regression.59 Obviously, regional house prices affect housing choices of 
households, but regional house prices should not be correlated with the unobserved household 
characteristics. Of course, this is true only to the extent that particular types of households are 
not endogenously selected into particular housing market regions. It is not implausible that a 
household’s location choice is correlated with, say, risk aversion. However, it is more 
plausible that risk aversion affects a household’s location choice within a given labour market 
or urban area. In order to avoid this sorting problem, we use a broad regional division, i.e. 
NUTS 4, in constructing the house price index. The NUTS 4 level division corresponds quite 
nicely to labour market regions. To reiterate the motive for this instrument, it may be that 
households’ location choice within a given labour market is partly driven by the same 
unobservable household characteristics as stockholding. However, we do not believe that 
households living in, for example, the Turku region are fundamentally different from the ones 
living in the Helsinki region after we control for observable household characteristics, such as 
income, wealth, age, education and occupation type.60  
                                                 
58 The corner solution nature of mortgage debt does not invalidate the testing procedure because the distribution 
of the error term in (7) plays no role under the null hypothesis. If exogeneity of mortgage debt is rejected, 
however, the two-step procedure cannot be used to consistently estimate the marginal effects of interest in (5).  
59 See the appendix for details. 
60 As an auxiliary informal test for the exogeneity of the house price index we estimated a stockholding model 
for renters who serve as a control group. The idea is that if the sorting story is credible we should probably 
observe that among renters as well. So we included the regional house price index along with all our controls 
directly into a probit regression explaining renter households’ stockholding. The house price index had no 
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Three variables are used to instrument mortgage debt. The first is an indicator that the 
household has used a bequest to finance the purchase of its first own house. Receiving a 
bequest can be seen as an exogenous wealth shock and should not be correlated with 
unobservable household characteristics. The second instrument is an indicator that the 
household is a first-time homeowner, i.e. it currently serves its first mortgage. This makes the 
household eligible for a larger tax deduction for mortgage interest than other households.61 
The third instrument is the price difference between the purchase price of the household’s 
current dwelling and the selling price of its previous dwelling. This difference is positive 
(negative) for households who moved to a more (less) valuable dwelling. If this difference is 
positive households are more likely to use a mortgage to finance their new house, and the 
larger the positive difference is the larger is the needed mortgage to bridge the gap. 
 
A rich set of household characteristics is controlled in the econometric models. These include 
current income, net wealth, age, education level, household composition, and socio-economic 
position or occupation type. Urbanisation rate is controlled to capture differences in access to 
financial services, opportunities for social interaction, and knowledge spill-over associated 
with urban environments.62 We also include a dummy indicating that the household has 
inherited financial assets within the last five years. The results for first stage instrument 
performance and exogeneity tests are presented in Table 5. The first four rows in Table 5 
include the first stage partial F-statistics for the explanatory power of the instruments and the 
Rivers-Vuong test statistics for all homeowners and also for sub-samples with and without a 
mortgage which are used later in the econometric analysis.63 The lower part of Table 5 
includes the first stage partial F-statistics and Hausman test statistics for exogeneity in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
explanatory power in the sub-sample of renters (a p-value of 0.423) suggesting that there is no direct channel 
through which regional house price level affects households portfolio choice, but instead the possible effect 
comes indirectly through housing choices of homeowners. 
61 From 1993 onwards the mortgage interest deduction has been made from capital income according to a flat tax 
schedule. If a household’s mortgage interest payments exceed capital income, which is the case for many young 
first-time buyers, the household is allowed to deduct the resulting tax deficit from its labour income tax liability 
in form of a tax credit. In this situation, the deduction rate is equal to the capital income tax rate except for first-
time buyers.  From 1993 to 1996 the capital income tax rate was 25 percent, and in 1997 and 1998 the tax rate 
was 28 percent. During this time the tax credit deduction rate for first-time buyers was 30 percent.  
62 Hong at al. (2004) find that social interactions play a role in stock market participation of U.S. households. 
63 Dividing the sample into homeowners with and without a mortgage also serves as an auxiliary test on the 
validity of the instruments. Households who own outright are likely to have lived in their homes longer, and 
thus, their location choice should not be as correlated with current house prices compared to homeowners with a 
mortgage who are likely to be more recent owners. The instruments perform well in both sub-samples.  
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 sub-sample of homeowners with stockholdings used in the second step of the sample selection 
model. The Hausman tests were implemented using an auxiliary regression approach. 
 
Table 5. Results for first stage instrument performance and exogeneity tests. 
N 
1st stage tests: house mortgage house mortgage house mortgage
artial F-test for instruments 110 74.6 59.1 12.6 81.4
vers-Vuong test (p-value)
Homeowners with stockholdings:
t stage tests: house mortgage house mortgage house mortgage
Partial F-test for instruments 37.8 24.6 29.0 4.3 16.4
man (p-value)
Stocks>0, Stocks>0, Stocks>0,
0.74   (0.996) 1.87   (0.393) 0.87   (0.351)
all mortgage>0 mortgage=0
774 315 459
2 437 1 064 1 373
0.20   (0.904) 0.18   (0.916) 0.13  (0.714)
















High partial F-statistics in the first stage indicate that the instruments have good explanatory 
power. The only specification where there is some doubt about the explanatory power of the 
instruments is in the sub-sample of stockowners with positive holdings of mortgage debt. The 
problem there was instrumenting mortgage debt. In that case, we reduced the number of 
instruments and used only the difference between purchase and selling price. The other two 
instruments had no explanatory power in this sub-sample. The price difference variable was 
statistically significant at 5 percent level; however, the F-statistic is small indicating the 
possibility of a weak instrument. Interestingly, the test results indicate that exogeneity is 
clearly not rejected in any model specification.  
 
3.3   Econometric results 
 
We start the analysis with the discrete choice of stockholding. The results of probit models are 
presented in Table 6. Because exogeneity of key variables was not rejected in any 
specification and the difficulty of estimating a model that allows for endogeneity in this 
setting, the reported marginal effects are from usual univariate probit models. The marginal 
effects are calculated at the sample means of the other covariates.  
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 In the first model in Table 6, house value gets the expected negative sign and is clearly 
statistically significant, whereas mortgage debt is not. Thus, a higher house value decreases 
the probability of stockholding. The result can be interpreted in two ways. First, households 
may be hedging against house price risk induced by a valuable house compared to net wealth, 
a result that would be in line with the simulation results in section 2. Second, since increasing 
house value at given net wealth and mortgage levels necessarily lowers financial wealth 
available for stock investment, a negative sign of house value may simply indicate that entry 
and participation costs become prohibitive. Moreover, households with low financial wealth 
may be reluctant to hold stocks because they cannot diversify their stock portfolios efficiently.  
 
Table 6. Probit models for stock market participation. 
Marginal Std. Marginal Std. Marginal Std. 
effect error effect error effect error
i
(i
ncome / 10 000 0.017 0.015 -0.008 0.038 0.010 0.019
ncome / 10 000)2 -5.2E-04 8.8E-04 3.1E-03 3.9E-03 -4.0E-04 9.7E-04
 wealth / 10 000 0.016** 0.002 0.019** 0.003 0.017** 0.002
(net wealth / 10 000)2 -5.5E-05** 9.4E-06 -9.6E-05** 3.0E-05 -5.8E-05** 1.1E-05
4 (ref. < 25) -0.022 0.090 -0.097 0.089 0.237 0.286
4 -0.093 0.079 -0.127 0.095 -0.011 0.209
4 -0.097 0.080 -0.174* 0.083 0.055 0.224
4 -0.120 0.075 -0.179** 0.064 0.029 0.219
   age 65– -0.093 0.086 -0.114 0.104 0.081 0.223
ation = 1a 0.037 0.029 0.102 0.051 -0.013 0.036
ation = 2 0.105** 0.032 0.119* 0.050 0.096* 0.043
ation = 3 0.207** 0.052 0.212** 0.077 0.215** 0.076
lue / 10 000 -0.009** 0.002 -0.010** 0.004 -0.008** 0.003
   mortgage / 10 000 0.002 0.005 0.0004 0.006
tly predicted as 1
tly predicted as 0
All homeowners Mortgage > 0 Mortgage = 0
2 437   (774) 1 064   (315) 1 373   (459)
258    (33 %) 81  (26 %) 191  (42 %)
1 537  (92 %) 694  (93 %) 823  (90 %)
Dummy variables for education level of household head. Reference group is comprehensive school only. 1 = high 
chool or vocational school, 2 = higher vocational, 3 = university degree.
-1 194 -535 -637
Notes: Results are from probit models where all explanatory variables are treated as exogenous. The dependent 
ariable indicates participation in the stock market either directly or trough mutual funds. All the models include the 
following control variables: occupation type of household head (9 categories), urbanisation rate of municipality (3 
ategories), education level of other household members (3 categories), an indicator that the household has inhereted 
financial assets within the last five years, number of adults and children in the household, and whether the household 
as female. Sampling weights are used in the estimation. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1and 5 
percent level, respectively. 
net
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In order to further investigate the role of leverage, we divide the sample of homeowners into 
those who have a mortgage and to those who do not. For the latter group, house value-to-net 
wealth ratio (h) cannot exceed 1, and so the division should give clearer evidence whether a 
 78
 risky leveraged position in housing is driving the results. We find no support for this 
hypothesis. House value has a negative effect of similar magnitude on stockholding of both 
types of homeowners suggesting that the result is driven primarily by the crowd-out effect not 
by the risk induced by leveraged position in housing. This means that homeowners with more 
valuable homes simply have fewer funds available for stock market investment than 
homeowners with less valuable homes and identical net wealth level.64 The marginal effect of 
house value may seem small but the result is also economically meaningful. For example, a 
one standard deviation increase in house value from the sample mean (about €95 000) 
decreases the probability of stockholding by about 6.5 percentage points.  
 
The interpretation of the effect of total net wealth is interesting as well. When house value 
and the size of mortgage debt are controlled for, changes in net wealth are actually changes in 
financial wealth. Now, the positive effect of net wealth can be interpreted in two ways. First, 
as financial wealth increases households are more likely to be able to overcome any 
participation costs involved with entering the stock market. Second, this result suggests that 
households become less risk averse as they gain more wealth. Unfortunately, it is impossible 
to substantiate the relative importance of these two effects from the data. A final note on the 
probit models is that according to prediction percentages we are not really doing a good job in 
explaining the participation of homeowners to stock markets.  
 
Next we look at share of financial wealth invested in stocks or mutual funds. Estimation is 
carried out in two steps as proposed by Heckman (1979). Identification of the model requires 
an exclusion restriction, i.e. a variable or variables that affect the participation decision but 
not the share invested.65 Prime candidates in this context are variables that affect the cost of 
participating, such as availability of financial services near a household’s residence. To 
achieve identification, we exclude the urbanisation rate variables from the level equation. 
Urbanisation rate can be seen as a proxy for the availability of financial services, and thus, as 
a proxy for participation costs. Once a household has entered the stock market, differences in 
                                                 
64 To further test whether the results are different for the two sub-samples we implemented a likelihood ratio test 
that is an equivalent of the Chow-test. The test did not reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the 
two sub-samples, which again indicates that mortgage debt is not a major factor influencing the participation 
decision. 
65 Technically the model is identified even if exactly the same variables are used in both steps. However, in that 
case identification relies on the normality assumption in the probit model and the second step is suspect to severe 
multicollinearity.   
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 access to financial services, opportunities for social interaction, and knowledge spill-over 
should not affect the share of financial wealth invested in stocks.66 Table 7 presents the 
results. The first model is the usual sample selection model estimated using OLS, and the 
other two are estimated using 2SLS with and without the sample selection correction term.67  
 
Table 7. Sample selection models for the share of stocks in financial portfolios. 
Coeff. Std. error Coeff. Std. error Coeff. Std. error VIF
constant 0.186 0.246 0.307 0.187 0.542 0.086
ncome / 10 000 -0.041* 0.017 -0.049* 0.024 -0.048** 0.013 6.938
ncome / 10 000)2 0.002* 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002** 0.0005 4.693
 wealth / 10 000 0.013** 4.4E-03 0.008* 4.0E-03 0.007** 2.0E-03 57.80
(net wealth / 10 000)2 -4.9E-05* 1.9E-05 -2.7E-05* 2.2E-05 -2.1E-05** 5.3E-06 23.72
. < 25) -0.110 0.114 0.049 5.7E-02 -0.107 0.069 11.41
-0.248* 0.117 -0.055 0.061 -0.201** 0.067 22.72
-0.170 0.115 0.032 0.058 -0.124 0.069 28.64
-0.192 0.121 0.034 0.065 -0.129 0.072 21.73
   age 65– -0.236 0.125 dropped -0.192* 0.084 12.82
ation = 1a 0.033 0.039 0.023 0.029 0.015 0.033 2.542
ation = 2 0.173** 0.048 0.132** 0.036 0.121** 0.033 4.307
ation = 3 0.209** 0.070 0.138** 0.052 0.125** 0.042 6.687
ue / 10 000 -0.0053 0.0028 -0.0042 0.0066 -0.0049 0.0058 3.586
   mortgage / 10 000 0.0071 0.0057 0.0139 0.0154 0.0096 0.0150 1.418
verse mills' ratio 0.232 0.140 0.041 0.101 27.96
 R2
Dummy variables for education level of household head. Reference group is comprehensive school only. 1 = high 




es: Dependent variable is the share of financial assets invested in stocks or mutual funds. All the models include 
the following control variables: occupation type of household head (9 categories), education level of other household 
embers (3 categories), an indicator that the household has inhereted financial assets within the last five years, 
number of adults and children in the household, and whether the household head was female.  In the second model, 
tandard errors are estimated using a non-parametric bootstrap with 1000 replications because a generated regressor 
is included. One age group is dropped because it included so few observations that the resampling often resulted in a 
ample that did not include households in that age group. Sampling weights are used in the estimation. ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1and 5 percent level, respectively. The last column includes the variance inflation 
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66 We also estimated the models without exclusion restrictions and the results were almost identical. However, 
this may indicate that the exclusion restrictions are not valid in the sense that they do not explain participation 
particularly well and do not create much additional variation in the inverse Mills’ ratio. An LR-test for joint 
significance of the urbanisation rate dummies in the probit model produced a p-value of 0.114. This suggests that 
we may have a problem with multicollinearity even with exclusion restrictions. High standard errors induced by 
multicollinearity may be one reason why we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no sample selection bias. The 
last column in Table 7 reports the variance inflation factors (VIF) for the key variables used in the model. They 
suggest that multicollinearity is a problem mainly for net wealth variables and the inverse Mills’ ratio.  
67 Because exogeneity was not rejected in the first step probit models, the inverse Mills’ ratios are calculated in 
the usual way.  
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 The results are qualitatively similar to the probit results when it comes to variables that are 
statistically significant in both steps. In the first model in Table 7, house value gets the 
expected negative sign but the estimate is not very precise. The p-value for the coefficient is 
0.060. Clearly this effect cannot be due to entry or participation costs since here we are 
dealing with homeowners with stockholdings. This would indicate that for homeowners with 
stockholdings, higher house value translates into a more risky portfolio which they balance by 
lowering the amount of stockholding.68 In the 2SLS models, the coefficient of house value is 
negative and of similar magnitude as in the OLS but standard errors more than double and the 
coefficients are clearly not statistically significant. Furthermore, even if the assumption of 
exogeneity is true, the effect of house value seems rather small; a €10 000 increase in house 
value reduces the share of stocks by merely 0.5 percentage points. 
 
Net wealth has a statistically significant positive effect on the share of financial wealth 
invested in stocks. Now that entry costs can be ruled out, the positive effect of net wealth 
suggests that households become less risk averse as they gain more wealth. This would 
indicate that household preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion, a result that is 
often found in empirical portfolio research. However, it must be emphasised that the 
discussion concerning the results from the sample selection models should be taken cautiously 
because of possibly poor exclusion restrictions and impreciseness of the coefficients of key 
housing variables. Furthermore, high standard errors induced by multicollinearity may also be 
partially responsible for not rejecting exogeneity using the Hausman test. On the other hand, 
the results concerning net wealth and education level seem robust across specifications.  
 
The fact that exogeneity of house value or mortgage debt was not rejected in any of our model 
specifications is interesting. This suggests that homeowners’ stockholding and housing 
choices are not driven by same unobservable variables. This means that either we are able to 
control for differences in risk aversion through control variables or that risk aversion does not 
significantly affect the housing and mortgage choices of Finnish homeowners. The latter case 
would indicate that housing and mortgage choices are driven primarily by consumption 
demand for housing services instead of investment demand for housing capital or mortgage 
                                                 
68 Again we divided the sample into sub-samples with and without a mortgage. When using OLS, the coefficient 
of house value changed considerably closer to zero for the latter group but the difference between the 
coefficients in the two sub samples was not statistically significant. We also implemented a Chow test. The test 
rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients are the same in both models. However, it is unclear what exactly 
drives this result because the sub-samples differ in many respects as can be seen from Table 4.  
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 debt. So it seems that Finnish households think of owner-occupied houses as homes rather 
than investment vehicles and do not necessarily understand the financial risks involved. Of 
course this speculation critically hinges on the validity of our instruments and the power of 
the exogeneity tests. Nevertheless, this seems a fruitful avenue for future research on how 
households perceive the risks involved with homeownership.  
 
The empirical results differ considerably from the predictions drawn from the simulation 
model in section 2. The most striking difference is the low level of actual stock market 
participation. Some of this can be explained by entry and participation costs and buffer stock 
saving motives. According to the econometric results, owner-occupied housing does offer a 
partial explanation for low levels of stockholding. However, considerable unexplained 
heterogeneity remains. This is in line with previous empirical findings on household portfolio 
choice from a number of countries as reported in e.g. Guiso et al. (2003). Some clear patterns 
do emerge from the econometric models in addition to housing. The most robust results were 
that net wealth and education level have a positive effect on both the decision to participate in 
the stock market and the share of financial wealth invested in stocks.  
 
4.   Conclusions 
 
This paper studied the link between homeownership and household portfolio choice. The 
starting point for the paper was the finding by Flavin and Yamashita (2002) that given the 
historical returns on different assets in the U.S. homeowners with a leveraged position on 
housing should hedge against house price risk by holding fewer stocks. This paper replicated 
the simulation results using Finnish asset return data and showed that house price risk may 
indeed be an important factor influencing Finnish households’ financial portfolios. The main 
contribution of the paper, however, was to put this prediction into an econometric test using 
the 1998 Wealth Survey, a household level data produced by Statistics Finland.  
 
Econometric results tell us that owner-occupied housing has an adverse effect on household 
stockholding. More precisely, a higher house value at a given level of net wealth clearly 
reduces the probability that a household enters the stock market. This result can be interpreted 
in two ways. First, at a given net wealth level higher house value exposes households to house 
price risk which might induce them to mitigate their stockholding. On the other hand, higher 
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 house value at a given level of net wealth and mortgage debt automatically means a lower 
level of financial wealth for the household. So the result may indicate that some households 
do not see it worthwhile to enter the stock market given their low level of financial wealth and 
possible entry and participation costs. Although, the results hinted that the latter effect is more 
important, the relative importance of these two effects cannot be deduced explicitly from the 
data we used. On the other hand, it seems that housing has only a small effect if any on the 
share of financial assets a household invests in stocks conditional on stockholding. However, 
the results concerning the share invested in stocks may suffer from a poorly identified model 
and should be taken only as suggestive. Further work is needed in this respect. What comes to 
other important factors behind stockholding, we find that wealthier and more educated 
households are clearly more likely to own stocks and also invest a larger share of their 
financial wealth into stocks.  
 
The results have also policy relevance as they suggest that the prevailing Finnish housing 
policy of promoting homeownership has an unintended effect of inducing households to hold 
fewer stocks. This is in contradiction with the ongoing public debate where encouraging 
stockownership and long-term savings of Finnish households is seen as an important policy 
goal. This should be taken into account when evaluating housing policy and the adverse 
effects should be weighed against the benefits of promoting homeownership. 
 
Some open questions remain for future work concerning housing and portfolio choice. Sinai 
and Souleles (2005) argue that owner-occupied housing should not be treated simply as an 
asset inducing a background risk for homeowners. Instead, the effective asset price risk 
depends on households’ expected tenure length and moving behaviour. An interesting 
extension in this line of research would be to explicitly control for expected tenure length. 
One would also want to control for whether a homeowner is expected to move up or down the 
housing ladder. These extensions might also explain why we couldn’t find evidence of risk 
aversion affecting the housing choices of Finnish households.  
 
An interesting future avenue would also be to study how households adjust their financial 
portfolios just before and after the purchase of their first owner-occupied house. However, 
this line of research requires the use of panel data. Furthermore, two important institutional 
changes have occurred in Finland that should be of interest for future research. Namely, new 
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 longer maturity mortgages have been introduced in Finland only recently. This should have an 
effect on the way households save during their life-cycle and on their expected moving 
frequency, both of which are closely connected to portfolio choice. In addition, mutual funds 
have made stockholding a possibility also for lower wealth households because through 
mutual funds these households are better able to diversify their portfolios. Both of these 
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 Appendix. Calculation of asset returns for the simulation model. 
 
The return from owner-occupied housing consists of capital gains, the rental value of housing 
services minus the costs of ownership, maintenance and depreciation. We estimate the capital 
gain using a national-level, quality adjusted house price index produced by Statistics 
Finland.69 An estimate of the gross rental value of housing services is obtained using the 1998 
Wealth Survey, where homeowners were asked to estimate their current house value. Using 
these values we estimate a hedonic regression to obtain a value for a constant quality house.70 
From renter households the data includes the rents they paid during the survey year. Again we 
used a hedonic regression to obtain an annual rent for a constant quality dwelling. The results 
are presented in Table A1. Due to small sample size, we assume that the marginal prices of 
attributes are equal across regions and allow the regional prices vary only through the 
intercept. The hedonic regression for house value is also used in constructing the regional 
house price index that is used as an instrument in the econometric models. 
 
The annual gross rental return from housing was obtained by dividing the constant quality 
annual rent by constant quality house value. This gave us an estimate of roughly 5 percent for 
the average annual gross rental return. We assume that this stayed constant during 1995–
2005. From this gross measure we subtract depreciation and property taxes.71 Unfortunately, 
there exits no measures of the depreciation rate of physical housing stock in Finland, thus, we 
use a commonly used annual rate of 2 percent as our measure. The municipal property tax is 
calculated as the annual national average weighted by municipal property values. Imputed 
rental income is not taxed in Finland. Also capital gains are tax-exempt if the household has 
used the house as a primary home for at least two years which we assume is the case.  
 
Stock returns are based on a dividend adjusted stock index of the Helsinki Stock Exchange 
(previously HEX and now OMX Helsinki index). The stock returns are taxed with a 
                                                 
69 This approach has its drawbacks because using a nationwide house price index understates the true level of 
uncertainty a homeowner faces by ignoring the idiosyncratic or house specific part of the risk.  
70 There is empirical evidence suggesting that homeowners are fairly accurate in estimating their house value. 
There is also evidence that the estimation errors are not correlated with house or owner characteristics. See, for 
example, Kiel and Zabel (1999) who find that American homeowner’s tend to overvalue their house by about 5 
percent on average. If Finnish households have a similar tendency this would lead to underestimation of the 
rental return to owner-occupied housing with the method used here. 
71 We assume that households spend annually on maintenance an amount that keeps the house in constant 
condition. This way we don’t have to separately account for maintenance costs and depreciation.  
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 proportional capital income tax rate which varied from 25 to 29 percent during the research 
period. Government bond return data is a government bond total return index produced by 
Datastream and includes bonds of all maturities. The return to bank accounts is obtained from 
the statistics services of Bank of Finland. We subtract the stamp tax which equals the capital 
income tax rate from interest and government bond returns. Mortgage interest is also obtained 
from the Bank of Finland and it equals the average rate on new mortgage contracts. Nominal 
mortgage interest is tax deductible according to a flat rate equal to the capital income tax rate. 
The cost of living index of Statistics Finland is used to convert the returns into real terms. 
 
Table A1. Results for the hedonic regression models. 
Coeff. Std. Error p-value Coeff. Std. Error p-value
constant 72 539 5 822 0.000 1 668 796.6 0.038
-669.0 96.82 0.000 -26.99 12.06 0.026
2 5.210 0.850 0.000 0.140 0.112 0.214
loor area 470.1 61.23 0.000 65.99 13.99 0.000
   (floor area)2 0.935 0.170 0.000 -0.082 0.086 0.342
acheda 29 881 5 231 0.000 125.9 585.2 0.830
wo-family house 35 308 5 348 0.000 295.0 640.4 0.646
erraced 20 011 3 874 0.000 899.8 393.6 0.023
n lot -4 569 3 877 0.239
building material wood -17 137 3 047 0.000 -997.6 382.3 0.010
b 27 190 2 989 0.000 1 647 485.5 0.001
emi-urban 5 881 3 153 0.062 285 557.6 0.610
ber of obs. 2 922 254
est (p-value) 39.2   (0.000) 5.88 (0.000)
djusted R2 0.53 0.55
Dwelling type dummies, reference is multi-storey block
   age
   (age)





   urban





b Dummy variables indicating the urbanisation rate of municipality, reference is rural regions
House value Rent
es: The dependent variables are house value and annual rent in euros. In both models the explanatory variables 
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This paper analyses the effects of imputed rental income from owner-occupied housing and 
its taxation on income distribution in Finland. Using micro-data from the 2004 Wealth Survey 
produced by Statistics Finland we find that owner-occupied housing has a significant impact 
on the well-being of many households. In 2004 imputed rental income constituted on average 
about 10 percent of homeowner households’ disposable income. Furthermore, including 
imputed rental income to household disposable income decreased overall inequality measured 
by the Gini index. The estimated tax revenue forgone in 2004 was 1.9 billion euros amounting 
to almost 15 percent of the total government income and wealth tax revenue collected that 
year. On the other hand, the tax subsidy resulting from non-taxation of imputed rental income 
is skewed toward high-income households who are more likely to be homeowners and also 
more likely to own outright. The paper also made a comparison of the current tax system 
where imputed rental income is untaxed to two alternative tenure neutral tax systems where 
imputed rental income is taxed. The results indicate that the effects on overall inequality 
depend vitally on the way the increased tax revenue is transferred back to the households. The 
calculations in this paper ignore any behavioural responses by the households. 
 
 
Keywords: Imputed rental income, tax subsidy, income distribution. 











 1   Introduction 
 
Housing is an important part of household welfare and a number of different subsidies and 
regulations have been implemented with the aim of ensuring a reasonable housing standard 
for all households. One of the most notable features of the Finnish housing subsidy system is 
the promotion of homeownership through tax subsidies, i.e. indirectly through tax law.72 
Partly due to its lenient tax-treatment, homeownership is the dominant tenure in Finland as 
about 65 percent of Finnish households are currently homeowners, and even a larger 
percentage owns a home at some point during their live-cycle. Using the tax treatment of 
private landlords as a benchmark, the preferential tax treatment of homeowners in Finland 
consists of the following provisions. First, homeowners do not have to pay taxes on imputed 
rental income or capital gains. Second, homeowners are allowed to deduct mortgage interest 
expenses even though the income associated with this cost is not taxed. Finland is by no 
means an exception in international context in this respect, as in many countries owner-
occupied housing is tax-favoured compared to other investments and housing tenure modes.73
 
The adverse effects of these types of tax subsidies to owner-occupied housing are well 
documented in the economics literature.74 First of all, lenient taxation of housing compared to 
other investments leads to slower economic growth because it induces households to over-
consume housing. This increases the existing housing stock at the expense of productive or 
business capital stock in the economy. Second, because of imperfect capital markets 
households’ life-cycle consumption profile is distorted as households need save for a down-
payment when buying a house. Third, households are encouraged to hold portfolios that are 
sub-optimal from diversification point of view. The main argument in favour of subsidising 
owner-occupied housing is that it creates positive externalities.75 Although, the positive (or 
negative) externalities of homeownership are difficult to substantiate empirically, it seems 
that the major tax advantages to owner-occupied housing cannot be justified on efficiency 
                                                 
72 Sometimes these subsidies are referred to as tax expenditures. This terminology highlights the fact that tax 
revenue lost due to different departures from the benchmark tax system should be accounted for in the 
expenditure side of the government budget.  
73 See Hendershott and White (2000) and Englund (2003) for surveys of different country practices and also for a 
review of the main aspects of taxing housing capital. 
74 See, for example, Skinner (1996), Gervais (2002) and Flavin and Yamashita (2002). 
75 See Dietz and Haurin (2003) for a review on social and private consequences of homeownership. Glaeser and 
Shapiro (2002) conduct empirical tests on various proposed externalities of homeownership.  
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 grounds. This study uses household level data to evaluate whether the tax advantages can be 
justified from a distributional point of view.  
 
The tax-favoured status of owner-occupied housing is well understood in Finland. For 
example, the Government Institute for Economic Research produces annually overall size 
estimates of different tax subsidies for budgetary purposes. However, there exists no attempt 
to evaluate the distributional impact of this policy.76 The purpose of this study is to fill that 
gap in some important respects. First, we estimate the income advantage derived from owner-
occupied housing and the impact it has on income distribution. In the second phase, we 
estimate the value of the subsidy resulting from the non-taxation of imputed rental income 
and provide an outline of the first round distributional incidence of the subsidy. In doing so, 
we compare two alternative ways of redistributing the increased tax revenue back to the 
households. First, we consider a scheme where each adult is given an equal size lump-sum 
transfer. Second, we lower the (flat) capital income tax rate so that the revenue accrued from 
taxing the larger capital income tax base where imputed rental income is now included stays 
constant. Unfortunately, because Finnish income taxation is based on incomes of individuals 
and because the data set used here is aggregated at household level, we cannot consider a 
reform where labour income taxes are lowered since we do not observe incomes of individual 
household members. The tax subsidy resulting from the non-taxation of capital gains is not 
measured in this study because of the difficulty in estimating capital gains. Furthermore, the 
analysis in this study ignores any behavioural responses from the households to the proposed 
tax reforms. 
 
This exercise is problematic because imputed rental income comes in non-monetary form as 
housing services, and thus, is unobservable to the researcher. The paper overcomes this 
problem by using a hedonic rent regression to predict imputed rental values for homeowners 
which can then be used as the tax base. The dataset used in this study is the 2004 household 
Wealth Survey produced by Statistics Finland. This dataset is good for the purposes of this 
paper because it includes better location information than is usually found in Finnish national 
level household surveys and allows us to estimate more plausible hedonic models.  
 
                                                 
76 There are some studies on the distribution of the benefit from mortgage interest deduction, see e.g. Viitamäki 
(1999). Latest overall size estimates can be found in Government Institute for Economic Research (2007). 
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 Results from previous similar studies from different countries show that including imputed 
rental income to households’ disposable income has only a small effect on overall inequality. 
On the other hand, most studies find that a tax on imputed rents would be progressive. This, 
of course, depends highly on whether the tax rate on imputed rental income is progressive or 
flat, and also on the way the increased tax revenue is returned to the households. Hills (1991) 
evaluates the distributional effects of tax advantages to owner-occupied housing in Great 
Britain. He finds that the benefit from the tax subsidies is clearly larger for households in the 
top income deciles. Follain et al. (1993) find that a tax on imputed rental income would 
progressive in the U.S. Yates (1994) uses Australian data and finds that imputed rental 
income has a significant impact on the well-being of many households, and that, including 
imputed rental income in households’ disposable income slightly decreases overall inequality. 
Bourassa and Hendershott (1994) go a step further from Yates’ results and evaluate the 
impact of taxing imputed rents in Australia. They find that a tax on imputed rental income 
would be clearly progressive. Recent contributors to the literature are Frick and Grabka 
(2003) who evaluate the impact of imputed rental income on income inequality in Great 
Britain, former West Germany and the U.S. They find that imputed rental income represents a 
significant share of owner-occupiers disposable income in all countries and including it into 
disposable income slightly decreases inequality.  
 
Main findings of this study can be summarised as follows. The results indicate that owner-
occupied housing has a significant impact on the well-being of many households. In 2004 
imputed rental income constituted on average about 10.7 percent of homeowner households’ 
disposable income. We also found that the government loses significant amounts of tax 
revenue because imputed rental income is untaxed. The estimated tax revenue forgone in 
2004 was 1.9 billion euros. This amounts to almost 15 percent of the total government income 
and wealth tax revenue collected that year. Furthermore, the tax subsidy resulting from the 
non-taxation of imputed rental income is skewed toward high-income households who are 
more likely to be homeowners and also more likely to own outright. However, also some low-
income households are homeowners and they may find it difficult to cope with tax payments 
if a tax on imputed rental income is implemented. We also find that the effects on overall 
inequality depend vitally on the way the increased tax revenue is transferred back to the 
households. Under the lump-sum per adult transfer scheme income inequality decreased 
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 slightly compared to the current system, whereas under the lowered capital income tax 
scheme inequality clearly increased. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates the tax subsidy resulting 
from the non-taxation of imputed rental income. The section also presents the main aspects of 
current housing taxation in Finland and discusses the benchmark tax system including the 
choice of deductible items. In section 3 the empirical methodology for estimating imputed 
rental income for homeowners is presented. Section 4 reports the results of the distributional 
analysis. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2   Defining the benchmark tax system 
2.1.   Tenure neutrality 
 
Tax subsidies (or tax expenditures) are usually defined as departures from the normal or 
benchmark tax structure that result in favourable tax treatment of particular activities or 
taxpayer groups.77 The concept is based on the notion that any income tax structure has two 
basic elements. The first element consists of the structural provisions necessary to implement 
the income tax on individuals and corporations, such as the determination of income, the rate 
level and the tax subject. This element constitutes the so-called normal tax structure. The 
second element consists of special provisions that deviate from a neutral tax system and are 
designed to favour particular industries, activities or taxpayer groups. Thus, the second 
element can be used to promote certain activities and to achieve social objectives the same 
way as direct expenditure programs. 
 
Defining a benchmark tax system for residential housing is difficult because of the dual role a 
house serves both as consumption good and as capital investment. As a generator of housing 
services, a house satisfies consumption needs, and as an asset, a house is taken into 
consideration when making investment decisions. To put it in another way, a house is a piece 
of capital that is used in producing a consumption good, i.e. housing services.78 These issues 
are very important when considering what provisions in the tax code actually constitute a tax 
                                                 
77 See e.g. OECD (1996). 
78 See e.g. Englund (2003). 
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 subsidy to homeowners.79 Basically, there are two stands that one can take. First, a house can 
be seen as a piece of capital that produces an income stream to the owner. For landlords this 
income comes in monetary form as rental payments, whereas for homeowners the income 
comes implicitly in the form of housing services or as imputed rental income. Furthermore, 
both types of owners may receive capital gains or capital losses as house prices fluctuate. 
Second, owner-occupied housing can be seen simply as a durable consumption good and 
housing services as a stream of consumption.  
 
The current income tax system in Finland is a so-called dual income tax system where capital 
and labour income are divided as different types of income and are taxed with different tax 
rates. Capital income is taxed with a flat rate, currently at 28 percent, whereas labour income 
is taxed with a progressive rate. Under the current system, homeowners do not have to pay 
taxes on imputed rental income and in most cases also capital gains are untaxed. The tax-
treatment of landlords differs from homeowners in these respects. Landlords must pay capital 
income taxes on the net rental income they receive and in most cases landlords are required to 
pay taxes on the capital gains that are realised when the house is sold. Homeowners and 
landlords alike do not have to pay taxes on realised capital gains if they or their family have 
used the house as their home for at least two consecutive years. So in effect, capital gains are 
taxed for most landlords and are untaxed for most homeowners. If an owner-occupied house 
is seen as a piece income producing capital and if homeowners are compared to landlords, the 
tax advantage to homeowners comes from the non-taxation of imputed rents and capital gains. 
Both have to pay a municipal property tax. 
 
In this framework, even though often highlighted in public debate, the deductibility of 
mortgage interest is not the fundamental tax subsidy that homeowners receive. In fact, it can 
be regarded as a tax subsidy only because the corresponding income (imputed rent and capital 
gains) is untaxed. If imputed rental income and capital gains were taxed, mortgage interest 
should be seen as an expense from producing taxable income and deductibility should not be 
regarded as a tax subsidy. The deductibility of mortgage interest can also be seen as a way to 
extend the fundamental tax advantage to less wealthy households who need mortgage 
financing to become homeowners.80 However, if owner-occupied housing is seen simply as a 
                                                 
79 Hills (1991) covers these issues at some length in the U.K. context. 
80 See e.g. Hendershott and White (2000). 
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 durable consumption good, the deductibility of mortgage interest clearly constitutes a tax 
subsidy because in general interest on consumer credit is not tax deductible in Finland. This 
study concentrates on the former interpretation and treats owner-occupied housing as a capital 
investment and defines the tax subsidies within the framework of Finnish income tax code. 
 
The tax subsidy resulting from non-taxation of imputed rental income and capital gains can be 
illustrated simply by comparing the after-tax return a landlord and a homeowner receive from 
investing in a similar house.81 Consider a landlord who owns a house with a value of V. Under 
the current Finnish income tax system, the annual net after-tax return for a landlord can be 
written as  
 
(1) ( )1 ,L R MI t d i gV Vτ
⎛ ⎞= − − − − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠V     
 
where t is the capital income tax rate, R the gross rent, d includes depreciation, maintenance, 
operation and other costs incurred from the house, τ  is the property tax rate, i the nominal 
interest rate, M the value of the loan taken for investment purposes and g the capital gain or 
loss.82 A homeowner, on the other hand, receives the gross rental income in housing services, 
with a rental value of R, and is allowed to deduct mortgage interest payments. Thus, the net 
after-tax return for a homeowner can be written as83  
 
(2) ( )1 .O R MI d t i gV Vτ
⎛= − − − − +⎜⎝ ⎠V
⎞⎟
                                                
    
 
The difference of the after-tax returns is  
 
81 For a more general treatment see Englund (2003). 
82 Here we assume that the house is actually sold at the end of the year so that capital gains or losses are realised. 
Under the current Finnish income tax system capital gains are taxed at realisation not when they actually accrue.  
83 The assumption that landlords and homeowners face the same maintenance and operating costs is a 
simplification that may not be correct. For example, Englund (2003) argues that homeowners face lower 
maintenance and operating costs because home production is untaxed. Furthermore, as illustrated by Henderson 
and Ioannides (1983) landlords may face higher costs because tenants do not have incentives to take proper care 
of the dwelling they occupy. This leads to more depreciation or higher maintenance and monitoring costs. On the 
other hand, Harding et al. (2000) argue that homeowners alike do not have sufficient incentives to take care of 
their house because future buyers are unable to perfectly monitor the condition of the house. Furthermore, the 
relative efficiency of landlords and homeowners in producing housing services depends on the structure of the 
property. Landlords may be more efficient in producing housing services from a multi-unit structure while the 




RI I tV d tVg
V
τ⎛ ⎞− = − − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠     
 
The first part of equation (3) is the tax subsidy resulting from non-taxation of net imputed 
rental income and the second term is the tax subsidy resulting from non-taxation of capital 
gains. Under a tenure neutral tax system, the difference O LI I−  should be zero. Basically, this 
can be achieved in three ways: (a) by taxing the imputed rental income and capital gains of 
homeowners and allowing them to deduct mortgage interest and other expenses from 
producing this income, (b) by abolishing the tax on landlords’ rental income and capital gains, 
and at the same time eliminating all deductions from landlords and homeowners, or (c) by 
abolishing the tax on landlords’ rental income and capital gains but allowing them to deduct 
interest expenses accrued from producing rental income. Although the last two would make 
the tax system tenure neutral, housing would still be tax-favoured compared to other assets. In 
this study, we examine the case (a) where homeowners are treated the same way as landlords 
(or other capital investors) under the current tax system. Thus, in the benchmark tax system, 
imputed rental income is taxed and homeowners are allowed to deduct expenses that are 
accrued from producing this income, i.e. mortgage interests, maintenance costs etc. Because 
the current Finnish income tax system is based on nominal income we will also deal with 
nominal measures.84  
 
2.2    Deductible items and size of the tax subsidy 
 
The Finnish income tax system is based on the notion that net income is taxable, i.e. costs 
from producing income are fully deductible from gross income. Thus, it is important to be 
precise on what these deductible items are. There are basically two kinds of homeowners in 
Finland. First, there are homeowners who own single family detached houses, i.e. they own 
the property they occupy. Apartment buildings (row houses and multi-storey blocks), on the 
other hand, are set up as housing companies and the homeowners who occupy the dwellings 
own shares from the company. The company owns the property and the shares give the owner 
the right to occupy (or rent out) the dwelling. This distinction is important when considering 
                                                 
84 The tax system considered here is tenure neutral. It is not necessarily optimal. For research on optimal taxation 
of housing capital, see e.g. Rosen (1985), Englund (2003) and Cremer & Gahvari (1998). 
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 new tax rules for homeowners because there are currently different deduction rules for 
landlords who own a property compared to landlords who own housing company shares.85  
 
Currently, landlords are allowed to deduct the following items from the gross rental income 
they receive: interest expenses on debt, municipal property tax, maintenance charge, 
appliance costs, insurance costs, water and electric costs if paid by the landlord, and repair 
costs that maintain the dwelling. In addition, if a landlord owns the whole property (e.g. a 
single family detached house) she is eligible for a depreciation allowance from her rental 
income. The depreciation allowance for landlords is currently 4 percent of the acquisition 
cost. For example, if a landlord initially paid 100,000 euros for the house, she would be 
allowed to deduct from gross rental income 0.04*100,000 = 4,000 euros in the first year, 
0.04*96,000 = 3,840 in the second year and so on. Of course this means that as the acquisition 
cost goes down, the future capital gain rises because for tax purposes capital gain is defined as 
the difference between acquisition cost and the selling price. So in effect, a landlord owning a 
property is able to defer some tax payments until she sells the property. A landlord owning 
shares of a housing company, on the other hand, is not eligible for the depreciation allowance. 
The housing company is allowed to write off the value of the building in its balance sheet but 
this does not benefit the individual landlord. In a perfectly tenure neutral tax system outlined 
according current tax-treatment of landlords, homeowners residing in single family detached 
houses would be eligible for a depreciation allowance similar to the one that landlords are 
eligible now if they own properties. However, this would create an obscure situation where 
homeowners are treated differently according to whether they own a property or housing 
company shares. For this reason we do not allow homeowners to make use of the depreciation 
allowance.  
 
The above discussion is related to the question of how to account for economic depreciation 
of housing structures for tax purposes. In principle, this can be done in two ways. First, one 
could simply allow homeowners to deduct annual maintenance costs from imputed rental 
income and any excess depreciation could be handled when capital gains are taxed because 
the capital gains or losses depend on house quality. Alternatively, one could assume that all 
houses depreciate roughly at the same rate and simply impute some rate of depreciation on 
                                                 
85 Also corporations own apartment buildings. However, since this paper is concerned with personal income 
taxation this aspect is not pursued further.  
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 house value. Unfortunately estimates of the depreciation rate of Finnish housing stock do not 
exist.86 The household level data set used in the empirical part of this paper includes the repair 
and maintenance costs stated by the owner. The problem with this measure is that some 
homeowners choose not to make repairs during a particular year. Instead, homeowners seem 
to make bigger repairs every now and then. According to our data, in 2004 roughly 41 percent 
of homeowners reported positive maintenance costs and the average amount that all 
homeowners spent on maintenance was 0.8 percent of house value. The average for those who 
did some maintenance was 2.2 percent of house value. In both calculations, house value is 
estimated by the owner. Although this choice is rather ad hoc, we assume that on average a 
homeowner spends on maintenance 1 percent of house value and allow this amount to be 
deducted from gross imputed rents for tax purposes. The house value we use for this purpose 
estimated by the owner. An alternative would be to simply deduct the actual maintenance 
costs. However, since the main focus of the paper is to study distributional aspects accounting 
for depreciation through this measure is problematic. The figure of 1 percent is consistent 
with the findings by Harding et al. (2007) from the U.S. Any depreciation in excess of this 
could be taken into account when calculating the capital gain or loss once the dwelling is sold. 
However, we will not deal with capital gains taxation in this paper.  
 
In addition to mortgage interest and depreciation, we allow homeowners to deduct municipal 
property tax payments, maintenance charge if the homeowner owns the dwelling through a 
housing company, waste management and insurance costs. In the case of a housing company, 
the company is liable for the property tax. The tax is passed on to share owners according to 
the floor area of the dwelling. In practise, the property tax is included in the maintenance 
charge that the share owners pay to the company. Usually the maintenance charge also 
includes items such as waste management, maintenance costs of common facilities and so on. 
These choices follow the current tax treatment of landlords. In addition to these items, some 
costs such as real estate agent costs should also be deductible. However, since we do not have 
data on these costs they are left out of the empirical analysis. Now, abstracting from capital 
gains the net imputed rental income for a homeowner can be written as  
 
                                                 
86 In a recent paper, Harding et al. (2007) find that in the absence of maintenance a typical home in the U.S. 
depreciates at a real annual rate of 3 percent. They also find that a typical homeowner spends on maintenance an 
amount that adds roughly 1 percent per year to the value of the home. Thus, the depreciation rate net of 
maintenance is estimated to be roughly 2 percent.  
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 (4) ,NIR R d iMτ= − − −  
 
where τ , i and M are defined above, and d includes all other deductible items discussed 
above. The tax subsidy associated with net imputed rental income equals 
 
(5) ( )tax subsidy ,t NIR t R d iMτ= ∗ = − − −  
 
where t is the capital income tax rate. From 5 it’s clear that although the deductibility of 
mortgage interest does not constitute a subsidy to homeowners when compared to landlords, 
the amount of mortgage interest payments does affect the amount of taxes paid if net imputed 
rental income is taxed.  
 
3   Estimating imputed rental income from owner-occupied housing  
 
In order to operationalise equations (4) and (5), we need to estimate the rental value, R, of the 
house a homeowner resides in. There are basically two ways to measure imputed rental 
income from owner-occupied housing.87 First, imputed rental income can be calculated as a 
rate of return on house value which would be received if this equity would be invested in 
some other asset (e.g. interest bearing account). The researcher would simply need to know 
the house value and assign some rate of return on it to get an estimate of the imputed rental 
income. In the second approach, imputed rental income is assumed to equal the market rental 
value of an analogous good. In the case of housing, gross imputed rental income is assumed to 
equal gross market rent received by a landlord from a similar dwelling. The reasoning behind 
this measure is that the rent an owner-occupier could receive by renting out the dwelling can 
be seen as the opportunity cost of not renting out the dwelling. Because the owner-occupier is 
not willing to rent out the dwelling she must value the services at least at the amount of 
market rent.  
 
The applicability of the above approaches ultimately depends on the type of data available 
from housing markets. For purposes of estimating imputed rental income from a given 
dwelling, one either needs an assessed value for it, or price or rent data from similar dwellings 
                                                 
87 See Katz (1983) for a more thorough presentation of valuing services of consumer durables. 
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 from the same housing market. In the latter cases, an estimate of dwelling value or the value 
of housing services from the dwelling can be derived using hedonic regression techniques. 
However, there are clear down-sides to this approach especially for housing units in areas 
where the number of comparable units is low. In the case where rent data are used, the 
problems may be even more severe because owner-occupied dwellings are often 
fundamentally different from rental dwellings. For example, single-family detached houses 
are rarely available for rent in Finland, and thus, a comparable measure for single-family 
owner-occupied houses is difficult to find. This problem is emphasised in rural regions where 
comparable rental and owner-occupied units simply do not exist. Because location is one of 
the most important attributes in house price determination this is by no means a small 
problem.  
 
Despite the weaknesses mentioned above, this study uses a hedonic rent regression to estimate 
a monthly rent for owner-occupied dwellings in our data sample. We prefer rent data over 
house value data for two reasons. First, the only house value estimates available to us are 
owner estimated values, and second, house values reflect, in addition to future rents, house 
price expectations. The tax on imputed rental income should be based on imputed rental 
income alone, not on price expectations. However, in this case capital gains should also be 
taxed. This way the tax treatment of homeowners would be close to landlords and 
stockowners. That is, imputed rental income would correspond to rents received by landlords 
and to dividends received by stockowners, and capital gains would be taxed when they are 
realised.  
 
Before we go into the hedonic regression we briefly describe the data. The dataset used in this 
study is the 2004 household Wealth Survey (WS) produced by Statistics Finland. The WS 
includes information on various household characteristics such as socio-economic status, 
demographics, income, taxes, housing and wealth. Most of the information in the survey data 
is collected from various administrative registers and the rest collected through interviews. 
The WS is a stratified sample drawn from all private households in Finland where the strata 
are created according to socio-economic status and income. In order to get reliable 
information on overall household wealth, entrepreneurs and high-income households are 
assigned a higher inclusion probability to the final sample. The selected households are given 
sampling weights so that the sample is representative of the whole population. In the 
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 following calculations sampling weights are used in order to make the results representative 
of the whole population.  
 
Statistics Finland assigns an estimate of imputed rental income to homeowner households in 
the WS sample by using information gathered from renter households on their monthly rents 
through a separate rent survey. Households are stratified according to dwelling characteristics 
and homeowner households are assigned the average monthly rent of the renter households in 
the same strata as a measure of monthly gross imputed rent. However, regional aspects are 
omitted from these estimates altogether, although population density of the municipality is 
controlled for with two levels, urban and rural.88 The technique used by Statistics Finland 
most likely leads to smaller variation in imputed rental income between different regions and 
households compared to using more accurate imputed rental values.  
 
Often the biggest drawback of using nationwide household level surveys for hedonic analysis 
is that the precise location of the dwellings is unknown. However, our data allows us to 
identify the location of a household’s dwelling in a more coarse regional setting. First, we can 
identify Helsinki and the rest of the capital region. Second, we can identify major university 
cities and other regional centres. Furthermore, Statistics Finland classifies municipalities into 
three categories according to urbanisation rate as described in footnote 17. A novelty of the 
2004 WS data set is that it includes a housing survey supplement where households were 
asked a number of additional questions concerning their housing choices and needs. For our 
purposes, the most interesting new information compared to prior household surveys is that 
household location within an urban area or a municipality can be identified more precisely 
than before. Namely, the data allows us to identify whether the dwelling is situated in the 
centre of the city or outside of it.  
 
Using the improved location information and the dwelling characteristics included in the 2004 
WS data set, we estimate the imputed rental income of homeowners using a hedonic 
regression approach. More precisely, a hedonic rent regression for free market rental 
                                                 
88 Statistics Finland defines a municipality as urban if 90 percent of its population resides in an urban area and 
the largest urban area has at least 15 000 inhabitants. Semi-urban municipalities are those where more than 60 
but less than 90 percent of the population resides in an urban area and the largest urban area has at least 4 000 
but not over 15000 inhabitants. Finally, rural municipalities are those where less than 60 percent of the 
population resides in an urban area and the largest urban area has less than 15 000 inhabitants. When a two-level 
classification is used urban and semi-urban municipalities are labelled as urban. 
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 dwellings is estimated and the parameter estimates are used to predict the monthly rent for 
owner-occupied dwellings in the sample.89 Before we go ahead with the estimation, we 
present some descriptive statistics on how owner-occupied and rental dwellings differ in order 
to see what the main concerns are when predicting rental values for owner-occupied homes 
using rental dwellings. Table 1 presents mean values for dwelling characteristics for different 
dwelling types in the WS data. From Table 1 it is clear that rental dwellings differ 
considerably from owner-occupied dwellings. First, they are mostly situated in multi-storey 
apartment buildings; only about 7.5 percent of rental dwellings are single family detached 
houses. In addition to differences in dwelling type, the biggest concern for the hedonic model 
is the fact that single family houses and owned apartments are much larger than rental 
dwellings in terms of floor area and number of rooms.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for different dwelling types. 
Owned single family 
houses Owned appartments Free market rental
N 1572 878 292
m2) 139.1 (56.7) 81.2 (34.2) 54.6 (27.6)
umber of rooms 4.83 (1.56) 3.18 (1.33) 2.09 (1.13)
ge (years) 25.9 (22.2) 29.1 (20.0) 35.7 (20.0)
 % 93.8 % 1.4 % 7.5 %
wo-family, % 5.7 % 4.1 % 6.5 %
erraced, % 0.1 % 37.7 % 9.2 %
ulti-storey block, % 0.0 % 56.7 % 74.0 %
ource: Author's calculations from the 2004 Wealth Survey of Statistics Finland


























We take this into account in the hedonic model by allowing only for a constant (presumably 
positive) marginal effect of floor area on gross rent. We make some comparisons and 
justifications for this choice below. Furthermore, since the purpose of the regression is to 
obtain out of sample predictions, finding a functional form that fits the rental dwelling data as 
closely as possible is of secondary importance.  Thus, the hedonic regression model takes the 
following simple linear form 
 
(6) ,ij i j i ijR α ε′ ′ ′= + + + +x β z δ y γ     
                                                 
89 This method for estimating the gross imputed rental income is used, for example, in the German Socio-
Economic Panel dataset. See Frick and Grabka (2003) for details. Also Eurostat recommends this approach for 
household surveys.  
 103
  
where Rij is the monthly rent of dwelling i in region j, x is a vector of dwelling characteristics, 
z a vector dummy variables indicating the regional housing market and location, y a vector 
household characteristics that serve as proxies for neighbourhood quality which is otherwise 
unavailable to us, and ε is the error term. It’s important to emphasise that a household’s 
characteristics do not determine the rent of the dwelling it resides in. They simply serve as 
proxies for neighbourhood quality.90 Ideally, one would like to estimate the hedonic model 
separately for each regional housing market but sample size limitations prevent us from doing 
so here. Thus, we assume that the (marginal) rents of dwelling characteristics are equal across 
regional housing markets and allow the housing market specific rents to vary only through the 
intercept. 
 
The results for the hedonic regressions are presented in Table 2. Even with the drawbacks of 
the data, the hedonic regression model explains a considerable amount of the variation in 
rents with an adjusted R2 measure of 0.61.91 In the regression we control for major cities92 and 
other regional centres93 and the location (city centre vs. outside) of the dwelling within each 
area. In addition, we control for smaller urban and semi-urban areas and also distinguish rural 
areas in four different parts of the country. The coefficients for the dwelling characteristics 












                                                 
90 See Ioannides and Zabel (2003) and Ioannides (2004) for details. The household characteristics explain 
roughly 7 percent of the variation in rents.  
91 Household characteristics explain roughly 7 percent of the variation in rents. 
92 These are Helsinki, Jyväskylä, Kuopio, Oulu, Tampere, and Turku. 
93 These are Hämeenlinna, Joensuu, Kotka, Lahti, Lappeenranta, Pori and Vaasa. 
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 Table 2. Results for the hedonic rent regression. 
Standard Standard
Coeff. error Coeff. error
constant 207.2** 59.65  outside of city centre:
loor area 2.965** 0.473    Helsinki 245.2** 56.47
-4.968** 1.338    other capital region 173.2** 58.17
2 0.045 0.015    Kuopio 51.28 92.58
   detacheda -66.18 48.26    Jyväskylä 145.0 94.12
wo-family house -75.77 48.10    Oulu 156.8* 73.73
rraced -32.98 38.41    Tampere 149.3* 65.99
lding material wood -59.79* 31.49    Turku 124.7 72.67
sy neighborhood -2.417 31.91    Hämeenlinna 167.1 143.6
mall house intensive area 37.46 30.07    Joensuu 110.62 145.5
ocation dummies: b    Kotka 29.74 148.8
ntre:    Lahti -21.00 93.36
sinki 279.0** 57.96    Lappeenranta no obs.
uopio 113.0 85.35    Pori 69.74 84.12
yväskylä 176.5* 84.16    Vaasa 183.5 148.7
u 287.7** 108.65    other urban regions 107.0 59.32
pere 203.1** 70.60    semi-urban regions 46.35 55.04
u 188.4* 75.94    rural west 24.31 80.36
eenlinna 189.4+ 108.18    rural east 7.66 60.16
oensuu 137.9 93.10    rural north 143.9 88.10
otka no obs. household characteristics:
i 141.1 84.83    disposable income 0.003** 0.001
a 163.9+ 93.90    (disposable income)2 -1.7E-09 1.6E-09
ori 107.1 84.02    number of children 34.66* 14.82
aasa 55.22 84.82    college degreed -3.696 17.24
her urban regions 28.30 40.00
ber of obs. Adjusted R2
est (p-value)
Dummy indicating that the household head has a college degree or higher.
292 0.61
11.37   (0.000)
es: The dependent variable is monthly rent. **, * and + indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, 
pectively.
Dwelling type dummies, reference is multi-storey block
Reference is rural regions in southern Finland.
   f
   age
   (age)
   t
   te
   bui
   noi
   s
l
 city ce
   Hel
   K
   J
   Oul
   Tam
   Turk
   Häm
   J
   K
   Laht
   Lappeenrant
   P
   V







































The parameter estimates in Table 2 are used to predict a monthly imputed rent for homeowner 
households. The annual gross imputed rental income for homeowners is obtained by 
multiplying the predicted monthly rent by the number of months the household has resided in 
the dwelling during the survey year.94 The net imputed rental income is obtained by making 
the deductions discussed in the previous section from the gross measures. To obtain the tax 
subsidy element, the net imputed rental income is then taxed according to a proportional 29 
percent capital income tax rate.  
                                                 
94 This method produces downward biased estimates of imputed rental income if the household has moved 
during the survey year from an owner-occupied dwelling to another owner-occupied dwelling or to a rental 
dwelling. Unfortunately, we are unable to identify these households.  
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In order to get some indication of how well the predicted imputed rents correspond to reality, 
we compare the predicted rental values to house value estimates made by the owners. These 
are compared in Figure 1 across house value deciles. Figure 1 also reports predicted imputed 
rents from a hedonic regression where in addition to variables in Table 2 a square term of 
floor area was included. In this regression, the square term was negative but was not 
statistically significant even at 10 percent level. Sampling weights are not used in Figure 1. In 
addition to our estimates, Figure 1 also includes imputed rental income estimates made by 
Statistics Finland. The predicted gross rents follow the house value estimates quite well in the 
lower part of the house value distribution. However, the estimated average gross rents fall 
clearly behind average house values in the top half even when floor area does not have a 
diminishing positive effect on imputed rent. Furthermore, our estimates also fall behind the 
estimates made by Statistics Finland. Perhaps this has something to do with the fact that 
Statistics Finland constructs its estimates using a separate rent survey which is probably more 
reliable in terms of covering the whole free-market rental sector.  
 
Figure 1 seems to give some justification for the use of the linear specification of floor area in 
the hedonic model both when compared to house values and the alternative estimates made by 
Statistics Finland. However, Figure 1 also suggests a potential problem in using market rents 
in estimating imputed rents for owner-occupied houses; expensive rental dwellings are rare, 
and thus, using market rents may not give a very accurate picture of imputed rents for 
expensive owner-occupied homes. However, it may also be the case that expensive houses are 
expensive because they include house price expectations. If this is the case, our hedonic 
estimates of imputed rental income are more reliable than estimates based on house value 































Gross imputed rent with a floor area squared term (left scale)
Gross imputed rent without a floor area squared term (left scale)
Gross imputed rent, Statistics Finland (left scale)















Figure 1. Predicted gross imputed rents and house value estimates according to house value 
deciles. 
 
4   Distributional analysis 
4.1   Overall measures 
 
According to our estimates the overall value of net imputed rental income was about 6.6 
billion euros in 2004. This is a little lower than the estimate of 6.7 billion obtained using the 
approach by Statistics Finland. In Finland imputed rental income makes up about 10.7 percent 
of homeowner households’ and 8.5 percent of all households’ total annual disposable 
income.95 Imputed rental income is even more important for outright owners with no 
mortgage debt. For them imputed rental income made up almost 13 percent of total disposable 
income. The magnitudes of these figures are similar to those reported by Frick and Grabka 
(2003) for other western countries. They report that imputed rental income makes up about 9 
percent of total income in Great Britain, about 7 percent in the U.S., and about 4 percent in 
                                                 
95 Disposable income includes wages and entrepreneur income, capital income, transfers received and transfers 
paid (excluding indirect taxes). Estimates of other sources of non-monetary income, such as benefit from a 
company car, are also included in disposable income. 
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 former West Germany. The low figure of former West Germany is explained by the low rate 
of homeownership in Germany compared to these other countries.  
 
The estimated tax revenue forgone in 2004 due to non-taxation of imputed rental income was 
1.9 billion euros. This is roughly the same as an official estimate for 2004 reported in the tax 
expenditure report by Government Institute for Economic Research (2007). To give these 
figures some perspective, the overall government tax revenue collected through income and 
wealth taxes in the same year was 12.9 billion euros. On the other hand, housing allowances 
added up to a total of 900 million euros in 2004 and the amount of tax revenue lost because of 
the mortgage interest deduction was about 370 million euros. So the non-taxation of imputed 
rental income is by far the largest individual housing subsidy. However, it must be 
emphasised that the amounts of the tax subsidies reported here are calculated at given housing 
tenure, house price and housing consumption levels and as such ignore any behavioural 
responses.  
 
4.2   Incidence across income deciles 
 
The benchmark income concept used in the distributional analysis is household disposable 
income as defined in footnote 95. In order to account for differences in household size and 
composition, and scale benefits in consumption, all income concepts used in the paper are 
scaled using the so-called modified OECD equivalence scale. The scaling gives the first adult 
in the household a weight of 1. Remaining adults in the household (defined as household 
members who are 14 years old or older) get a weight of 0.5 and children (members under the 
age of 14) get a weight of 0.3.  
 
Because the impact of imputed rental income on income distribution is largely driven by the 
position of homeowners (especially those who own outright) in the income distribution, we 
start the distributional analysis by looking at the composition of income deciles according to 
household’s housing tenure and financing choice. Overall in 2004, 66 percent of Finnish 
households were homeowners and of these 56 percent owned outright. Figure 2 presents the 
tenure composition of income deciles which are constructed based on equivalence scaled 
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Figure 2. Composition of income deciles according tenure type and financing. 
 
According to Figure 2 homeowner households are situated in the top half of the income 
distribution. Furthermore, the share of outright owners of all households tends to increase as 
we move to higher income deciles. However, also some low income households are 
homeowners. Further calculations show that 60 percent of outright owners in the three lowest 
income deciles, in fact, are households where the household head was retired. Typically, these 
households have low current income but may be wealthy with a large part of their wealth 
invested in housing.  
 
This is illustrated more clearly in Figure 3 where we can see how much net imputed rental 
income makes up of homeowner households’ disposable income in different income deciles 
(bar on the right). The shares are calculated conditional on homeownership. For homeowners 
situated in the lowest decile, imputed rental income makes up over 30 percent of their annual 
disposable income. Clearly, these households would find it difficult to cope with a tax on 
imputed rental income. Figure 3 also illustrates the way the tax subsidy, as defined in 
equation (5), is spread out across income deciles. Naturally, as the share of homeowners rise 
with income, also the share of the subsidy that goes to the homeowners rises. However, the 
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homeowners in the top two income deciles receive clearly more than their proportionate share 
of the subsidy. Especially the highest decile stands out in this respect. Overall, 65 percent of 
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Figure 3. Distribution of homeowners and the tax subsidy according to income deciles. 
 
Figure 4 reports mean values of imputed rental income and the tax subsidy across income 
deciles. The mean values are calculated conditional on homeownership. Mean values for 
owner’s estimated house value and housing equity (house value minus mortgage debt) are 
also reported for reference.  Homeowners situated in higher income deciles clearly have more 
expensive houses and also higher housing equity. Relatively high house values and housing 
equity in the lower deciles is again probably explained by retired households who own 
outright and have low current income. On average, homeowners’ annual tax subsidy was 
1206 euros. Somewhat surprisingly the differences in imputed rental income and the tax 
subsidy are quite small across income deciles. The information in Figures 2, 3 and 4 indicates 
that homeowners situated in the top income deciles benefit most from the tax subsidy mainly 
because they live in expensive houses and are more likely to own outright, which means that 
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Figure 4. Mean imputed rental income and tax subsidy according to income deciles. 
 
 
4.3.   Impact on overall inequality and re-ranking effects 
 
Next, we turn our attention to the impact of imputed rental income and its taxation on overall 
inequality. The analysis is based on the following income concepts: 
 
1. Disposable income without imputed rental income 
2. Disposable income + net imputed rental income 
3. Disposable income + net imputed rental income – a tax on imputed rental income 
4. Disposable income + net imputed rental income – a tax on imputed rental income + a 
tax revenue neutral lump-sum transfer 
5. As 4, but tax revenue neutrality is achieved through a lower capital income tax rate.  
 
The idea behind the concepts 4 and 5 is that the increased tax revenue from taxing imputed 
rental income is transferred back to the households so that overall tax burden in the economy 
stays constant. In the lump-sum transfer scheme, the increased tax revenue is returned to all 
 adults as an equal size transfer. This of course treats differently households with and without 
children. However, this way we try to mimic a change in the income tax system, and not 
confuse this with a change in means tested allowances, such as child allowances. In the 
capital income tax scheme, imputed rental income is included in the capital income tax base 
and the capital income tax rate is lowered so that the overall revenue from the capital income 
tax stays constant. Alternatively, one could lower labour income tax rates. However, Finnish 
income taxation is based on individual not on household income, and since the data is at 
household level a lower labour income tax cannot be taken into consideration in this study. 
The two schemes considered here can be seen as extreme cases and the alternative of cutting 
labour income taxes would probably be somewhere in the middle depending on how the tax 
rate cuts are targeted.  
 
Table 3 presents quantile ratios, Gini indices and differences in Gini indices for the five 
income concepts presented earlier. The measures are calculated using the Distributive 
Analysis Stata Package (DASP) developed by Araar and Duclos (2007a and 2007b).96 Table 3 
also includes basic distributional statistics for the different income concepts. 
 
Table 3. Income inequality and imputed rental income. 











Mean 29 500 32 251 31 319 32 118 32 242
dian 16 344 18 113 17 576 18 112 19 616
0 8 702 9 476 9 281 9 831 9 613
0 30 376 32 989 32 173 32 803 37 041
uantile ratios:
10 3.49 3.48 3.47 3.34 3.85
50 1.86 1.82 1.83 1.81 1.89
10 1.88 1.91 1.89 1.84 2.04
ni 28.79 28.04 28.08 27.48 28.88
fferences in Gini 1 vs. 2 2 vs. 3 3 vs. 4 2 vs. 4 2 v.s 5
0.75* -0.05 0.61* 0.56* -0.84*
ource: Author's calculations from the 2004 Wealth Survey of Statistics Finland.
es: All income concepts are adjusted by the modified OECD equivalence scale. * indicates that the difference is 
































                                                 
96 Araar Abdelkrim and Jean-Yves Duclos (2007a): DASP: Distributive Analysis Stata Package. PEP, CIRPÉE 
and World Bank, Université Laval. 
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 A positive (negative) difference between the Ginis for different income concepts means that 
overall inequality decreases (increases) when moving from one income concept to the next. 
From Table 3 we see that adding imputed rental income to disposable income clearly 
decreases overall inequality measured by the Gini index.97 This is rather surprising given the 
fact that homeowners are situated mostly in the top half of the income distribution. However, 
some low and especially middle-income households also benefit from imputed rental income, 
and for them the share of imputed rental income of overall income is much larger. The results 
differ somewhat from the ones found from other countries. For example, Frick and Grabka 
(2003) find that including imputed rental income to disposable income slightly increases 
inequality in Great Britain and in the U.S. They do not report statistical significance of their 
results but the differences are smaller than reported in Table 3. The decrease in inequality in 
Finland is statistically significant at 5 percent risk level.  
 
Taxing imputed rental income slightly increases inequality (2 vs. 3) but the change is not 
statistically significant. Perhaps the most interesting comparison in Table 3 is the one where 
income concept 2 is compared to concepts 4 and 5. These comparisons compare the current 
tax system (2) to two alternative tax systems where imputed rental income is taxed in a 
revenue neutral way (4 and 5). Under the lump-sum transfer scheme all adults receive a 
transfer of 476 euros, whereas the capital income tax scheme allows for a reduction of the 
capital income tax rate from the then current rate of 29 to 17 percent. That is, under the latter 
scheme the tax rate on all capital income including imputed rental income is 17 percent. The 
results are markedly different depending on the way the accrued tax revenue is transferred 
back to the households. Compared to the current system, overall inequality is smaller in a 
system where imputed rental income is taxed with the then current tax rate of 29 percent and 
the accrued tax revenue is transferred back to the households as lump-sum transfers (2 vs. 4). 
However, when the accrued tax revenue is used to lower the capital income tax rate on all 
capital income, inequality clearly increases compared to the current system (2 vs. 5). 
According to quantile ratios, under the system with a lower capital income tax rate the lowest 
decile is clearly left back compared to the median and the highest decile. Under the lump-sum 
scheme, the lowest decile actually moves slightly closer to both the median and the highest 
decile.  
 
                                                 
97 There were no Lorenz dominating relationships between the income concepts. 
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 The results indicate that from a distributional point of view it is vital how the new tax revenue 
is transferred back to the households. This aspect is important also from a political economy 
point view when considering what type of tax reforms are actually politically feasible under 
current tenure shares and housing consumption choices.98  
 
In order to look deeper into what is happening to the income distribution a decomposition 
analysis is performed based on subgroups of households. Here the measure of inequality is the 
generalised entropy index which can be naturally decomposed to within and between 
variations among different subgroups.99 Again the estimations are done using DASP. The 
population is divided into subgroups based on housing tenure type and age. Housing tenure is 
divided into three groups; outright owners, owners with a mortgage and renters. The 
decomposition results are presented in Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Decomposition of inequality by tenure type and age, generalised entropy index. 











Total population 14.67 13.90 13.93 13.58 14.79
enure:
ner outrigth 19.50 15.99 16.74 16.00 17.96
ner, mortgage 8.81 7.63 7.87 7.60 8.10
Renter 12.33 12.33 12.33 12.48 12.77
rcentage of total:
ithin-group 91.18 84.49 86.75 86.74 85.92
Between-group 8.82 15.51 13.25 13.26 14.08
ge group:
14.01 14.19 13.81 12.65 14.03
9.27 9.18 9.13 9.08 9.37
36–45 10.09 9.77 9.76 9.53 10.24
12.14 11.11 11.19 10.68 11.77
24.23 21.59 22.13 21.74 24.06
11.29 10.13 10.24 9.71 11.08
7.17 6.60 6.61 7.98 6.98
Percentage of total:
ithin-group 87.32 86.04 86.38 86.63 86.12
Between-group 12.77 13.96 13.62 13.37 13.88
es: All income concepts are adjusted by the modified OECD equivalence scale.

































                                                 
98 See e.g. Eerola and Määttänen (2006).  
99 See the Appendix for details on the index and decomposition.   
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 The results using the generalised entropy index are very similar to the ones obtained using the 
Gini index when it comes to inequality in the population as a whole. We consider first the 
subgroups based on housing tenure. According to the results in Table 4 the degree of 
inequality is lowest within the group of owners who have a mortgage. This is not surprising 
because these households are probably in a similar stage of their life-cycle and are at least so 
well off that they can cope with mortgage payments. On the other hand, income inequality is 
largest within the group of outright owners. Including imputed rental income to disposable 
income clearly decreases inequality among both owner types, but the decrease is much larger 
among owners who own outright. Again this is to be expected because for outright owners 
imputed rental income makes up a larger fraction of their disposable income. By definition, 
inequality among renters does not change because they do not receive imputed rental income. 
However, between-group inequality naturally rises after including imputed rental income.  
 
What happens to inequality in the subgroups under the alternative tax systems? Under the 
lump-sum transfer scheme, inequality within the two owner groups stays almost constant and 
is slightly increased among renters compared to the current system.100 Because there is a clear 
decrease in inequality at the level of total population, the results indicate that the decrease in 
overall inequality is mostly due to a decrease in between-group variation. This can also be 
seen from the fact that the relative contribution of between-group variation to total inequality 
clearly decreases. This means that under the lump-sum redistribution scheme renters catch-up 
to owners, although among renters inequality increases compared to the current system. 
Under the system with a lower capital income tax rate, inequality rises within each tenure 
subgroup. However, also here the contribution of between-group variation to total variation 
decreases. Interestingly, under both alternative tax systems, inequality increases within the 
renter group.  
 
The lower part of Table 4 includes the results for age group decomposition, where age refers 
to the age of household head. During the life-cycle income inequality is relatively high among 
young households (under the age of 25), clearly decreases among the next group (26 to 35), 
and then follows a hump-shaped age pattern peaking among households whose head is 
between 56 and 65 years of age. When imputed rents are added to disposable income, 
                                                 
100 The reason that inequality changes among renters is that the lump-sum transfers are made according to 
number of adults in the households whereas we weight household members according to the OECD equivalence 
scale.  
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 inequality decreases among all age groups except among the households whose head was 
under 25. The alternative tax systems differ also in the way they affect inequality among 
different age groups. Under the lump-sum transfer scheme, inequality decreases among all 
groups except among the very oldest. On the other hand, under a lower capital income tax 
rate, inequality rises across all groups except the youngest. The rise in inequality under this 
scheme is greatest among the group where household head was between the ages of 56 to 65. 
Again between-group inequality decreases but the decrease is not as large as it was when the 
group division was based on tenure.  
 
Finally, we look at re-ranking effects. Table 5 presents transition matrices that illustrate the 
extent to which households’ income rankings change as a result of including imputed rents to 
disposable income and under the alternative tax systems considered in the paper. The 
uppermost transition matrix compares the income positions of households with and without 
imputed rental income. The two lower matrices compare the income positions of the current 
tax system to the two alternative tax systems. If all the households remain in the same income 
decile under both income concepts all diagonal elements of the matrices in Table 5 should 


















 Table 5. Transition matrices for re-ranking effects.  
Initial income = 1
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X All
I 82.1 17.9 100
II 13.9 50.5 35.9 100
III 3.0 22.3 35.8 39.1 100
Final IV 8.6 24.7 32.4 34.2 100
income = 2 V 0.42 0.84 3.0 25.3 38.3 31.8 100
VI 3.7 26.1 46.0 24.8 101
VII 1.1 20.6 56.8 20.9 99
VIII 1.1 1.8 18.1 66.8 12.5 100
IX 12.4 79.6 7.8 100
X 7.8 92.1 100
All 101 100 99 101 100 100 100 100 100 100
Initial income = 2
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X All
I 95.4 3.9 0.13 0.06 0.42 100
II 4.6 88.2 7.0 0.39 100
III 8.1 79.6 12.2 0.28 100
IV 13.5 75.7 9.6 1.1 100
ome = 4 V 11.5 77.4 10.9 100
VI 12.0 80.9 7.1 0.22 100
VII 8.8 84.0 7.1 100
VIII 8.3 87.0 5.0 100
IX 4.8 92.0 3.1 100
X 2.8 96.8 100
All 100 100 100 100 100 101 99 100 100 100
Initial income = 2
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X All
I 96.4 3.9 100
II 3.6 93.6 3.1 100
III 2.7 90.1 6.7 100
IV 7.0 87.9 5.1 100
ome = 5 V 5.3 86.8 7.8 100
VI 7.7 88.0 4.3 100
VII 4.8 91.3 4.1 100
VIII 3.8 92.8 3.1 100
IX 3.3 92.2 5.1 101
X 4.6 94.9 100































The extent of re-ranking due to imputed rental income is surprisingly large. Especially the 
households in the middle income deciles are extensively re-ranked as clearly less than half of 
the households remain in their original income decile. On the other hand, most of the shifts 
from one decile to another are shifts to the very next decile. In every case, about 85 percent of 
households remain in the same decile or are shifted to the very next, either up or down. 
Lowest and highest deciles stand out as cases where households mostly remain in their 
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 original income decile. However, nearly 18 percent of the households in the lowest income 
decile improve their relative income position, which means that imputed rental income is an 
important item for some low-income households and may be an important factor in poverty 
reduction.101 Again the flip side to this is that these households would probably find it hard to 
cope with a tax on imputed rental income.  
 
The re-ranking caused by moving from the current tax system to a system where imputed 
rental income is taxed can be seen from the two lower matrices in Table 5. More re-ranking 
takes place when moving to the lump-sum transfer scheme than to the capital income tax 
scheme. This is to be expected because a lower capital income tax rate affects fewer 
households than the lump-sum transfer scheme. More precisely, low-income renters clearly 
benefit from the lump-sum transfer scheme whereas they rarely have capital income, and thus, 
do not benefit from a lower capital income tax rate. In fact, most renter households are 
probably totally unaffected by a reform where imputed rental income is taxed and the tax 
revenue is used to lower the capital income tax rate. On the other hand, some low-income 
homeowners are made clearly relatively worse off under both alternative tax schemes. 
 
Since the results presented here ignore behavioural responses by households to the proposed 
reforms some discussion on the likely behavioural effects is in order. In a tenure neutral tax 
system, households would have a smaller incentive to choose owning versus renting. 
Furthermore, when imputed rental income is taxed those households who would choose to 
own would probably want to own smaller houses. This would probably lower house prices at 
least in the short run. However, this effect is mitigated by an increase in the demand for rental 
housing because households have to consume housing services in any case. Since taxing 
imputed rental income would lower other taxes, the decline in housing demand would also be 
counteracted by a positive income effect due to the fact that housing is a normal good. The 
exact effect of a tax reform on overall housing demand vitally depends on the way other taxes 
are changed when the new tax is introduced. There are also reasons why some households 
would be reluctant to switch from owning to renting. Perhaps the most obvious reason is that 
single family detached houses are rarely up for rent. Households with a strong preference for 
                                                 
101 Frick and Grabka (2003) find that imputed rental income yields clear reductions in poverty especially for 
older households in Great Britain, former West Germany and the U.S.  
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 this type of housing would probably continue to own or pursue homeownership even under a 
tenure neutral tax system.  
 
5   Conclusions 
 
This study analysed the effects of imputed rental income from owner-occupied housing and 
its taxation on income distribution in Finland. The results indicate that owner-occupied 
housing has a significant impact on the well-being of many households. In 2004 imputed 
rental income constituted on average about 10.7 percent of homeowner households’ 
disposable income. Furthermore, including imputed rental income to household disposable 
income clearly decreased overall inequality measured by the Gini index. We also found that 
the government loses significant amounts of tax revenue because of non-taxation of imputed 
rental income. The estimated tax revenue forgone in 2004 was 1.9 billion euros which 
amounts to almost 15 percent of the total government income and wealth tax revenue 
collected that year. Furthermore, the tax subsidy resulting from non-taxation of imputed rental 
income is skewed toward high-income households who are more likely to be homeowners and 
also more likely to own outright. More than 65 percent of the total tax subsidy went to the top 
half of the income distribution. However, we also find that some low-income, mostly retired 
homeowner households would find it difficult to cope with a new tax on imputed rental 
income. 
 
The paper also compared the current tax system where imputed rental income is untaxed to 
two alternative tenure neutral tax systems where imputed rental income is taxed. In both 
systems, the increased government tax revenue was returned to the households so that the 
overall amount of government tax revenue stayed constant. In the first scheme, the increased 
tax revenue was returned to all adult individuals as equal size lump-sum transfers, and in the 
second scheme, the capital income tax rate was lowered so that the total tax revenue from 
capital income taxes stayed constant Due to the nature of the data used we were unable to 
experiment with different tax rate cuts in labour income taxes which would probably be the 
most realistic alternative compared to the ones considered here. 
 
We find that the effects to overall inequality depend vitally on the way the increased tax 
revenue is transferred back to the households. Under the lump-sum transfer scheme income 
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 inequality decreased slightly compared to the current system, whereas under the lowered 
capital income tax scheme inequality clearly increased. These, of course, are short run results 
that ignore any behavioural responses from the households. On the other hand, Gervais (2002) 
finds that even in the long run distributional effects of taxing imputed rents may be small. 
Assuming that the efficiency gains from a tax on imputed rental income are compelling this 
can be seen as an encouraging result. However, as was shown by Eerola and Määttänen 
(2006) homeowner households may be reluctant to vote for a reform that aims to tax imputed 
rental income because the efficiency gains of the reform materialise only in the long run and 
negative short run effects overweigh the positive ones in current homeowners’ decisions.  
 
These results indicate that any attempt to introduce a tax on imputed rental income should be 
accompanied by a package of tax cuts that mitigate welfare losses to current homeowners, and 
thus, could be sold to the voters. For example, our results suggest that using the tax revenue to 
lower the capital income tax rate would probably not be a very popular policy option in a 
country like Finland where income equality and social cohesion are highly regarded. One 
option that may prove to be politically feasible is to cut labour income tax rates so that the 
overall progression in the tax system stays more or less constant. To know the exact way to do 
this would require individual level tax register data and a sophisticated microsimulation 
model. This could be a fruitful avenue for future research. In addition, this type of reform 
could be accompanied by a transition period where the effective tax rate on imputed rental 
income is raised gradually. However, the purpose of this discussion is not to indorse any 
particular reform, but instead, to highlight the importance of the way the increased tax 
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 Appendix. Decomposition of the generalised entropy index by population subgroups. 
 
Sampling weights are used in the calculation of the inequality indices. First, we denote the 
sampling weight of household i as hwi and household size as hsi. Now, we define the weight 
each household gets in the calculations as wi = hwi* hsi.102  
 
The inequality index used in the decomposition analysis in Table 4 is actually the so-called 
Theil-L index which is a member of the family of generalised entropy indices.103 When 
















⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑∑
 
 
where w is the weight of household i as defined above, n the number of households, y the 
income of household i, and µˆ  is the mean of household income in the sample. A 
decomposition analysis for m population subgroups can be carried out in the following way. 
Letting sj denote the population share of group j and Tj the Theil-L index within that 










= +∑ T  
 
where T  is Theil-L index for the whole population when each household in subgroup j is 
given the mean income of subgroup j. That is, the first term measures within group inequality 
and the latter term measures between group inequality. The weighting in the first term in (A2) 





                                                 
102 See Araar and Duclos (2007b) for details on how to implement these using the DASP software package. 
103 See Shorrocks (1980) for details. 
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